בס”ד

צדק צדק תרדוף למען תחיה וירשת את הארץ

Pay It Forward: A Jewish Movie Review

Pay It Forward is a 2000 drama film directed by Mimi Leder, loosely based on the novel of the same name by Catherine Ryan Hyde. The story centers on Trevor McKinney, a young boy living in Las Vegas, who responds to a school assignment with a bold and idealistic idea: instead of repaying a good deed, one should “pay it forward” by doing a meaningful act of kindness for three other people. The hope is that this generosity will multiply, creating a ripple effect of goodness throughout society.

Trevor’s idea slowly catches on, touching lives in unexpected ways across the country. Eventually, a journalist tracking the phenomenon arrives to interview Trevor, now considered the movement’s unlikely originator. Trevor reflects that he himself has gained from the experience: his fractured family has begun to heal – his mother reconnected with her estranged mother, who as a result attended his birthday party. The film thus suggests that kindness, even when selfless, circles back with personal benefit.

Yet the narrative concludes with a sobering twist. In an act of bravery, Trevor steps in to defend a classmate from bullies and is fatally stabbed. The film ends on this tragic and unresolved note, casting a shadow over its otherwise uplifting message. It leaves me, as a rabbi, with a lingering and uncomfortable question:

Does Judaism maintain that it is in a person’s best interest to act with kindness and do good? Is the world morally wired in such a way that good ultimately brings good in return?

Pursuing Justice

The Torah teaches:

Equity, equity you are to pursue, in order that you may live and possess the land that your God is giving you!¹

Pursuing justice is fundamentally essential to life and national flourishing. A just society – built on fairness, accountability, and ethical leadership – is one in which people can live securely and thrive. This verse underscores the necessity of establishing courts – objective, honest, and principled ones. ²

When someone strives to establish such institutions, he is, in a sense, causing himself harm. These systems, by their very nature, impose restraint – they limit personal freedom, hold people accountable, and punish wrongdoing. At first glance, this should make the pursuit of justice seem unattractive or even counterintuitive. Yet, as the verse teaches,³ it is ultimately in our best interest. Building a just system may come at a personal cost, but it enables the individual to live in a flourishing, stable society – and that, in turn, benefits him directly.⁴

This principle applies not only to societies, but to individuals as well. As it says:

He who pursues righteousness and lovingkindness will find life, righteousness, and honor.⁵

The pursuit of righteousness kindness is not just noble, it is ultimately beneficial. The one who seeks to do good, will be repaid with goodness.

The Mitzvah to Pursue Justice Through Courts

The Torah commands us to pursue justice: to establish courts in every city and appoint officers who will enforce their rulings.⁶ The verse states:

Judges and police officers you shall appoint for yourself in all of your cities.⁷

Following this, the Torah lays out a code of ethics for judges and introduces a broader framework for a functioning legal system. While this system is binding specifically for the Jewish people, the Torah also recognizes a universal need for justice: all nations are obligated to establish courts and legal structures of their own. As the Tosefta (Avodah Zarah 9:4) teaches:

Just as Jews are commanded to set up courts in their cities, so too are the sons of Noach commanded to set up courts in their cities.⁸

A legal system is what allows society to function. However, we must also acknowledge the limitations inherent in any human court.

Courts, by their nature, cannot always administer perfect justice. Judges are limited in their ability to grasp a person’s inner intentions, motives, capacity to choose otherwise, and moral awareness. Their understanding is necessarily shaped by the information presented before them. As the Talmud teaches: “a judge has only that which his eyes see”.⁹

There are also inherent limitations in the laws themselves. While the laws may be just, it is impossible to formulate a legal code that accounts for every individual case with perfect justice specific to that case. And if judges were given total discretion, we would risk corruption, bias, or lapses in judgment. Therefore, it is preferable to have an imperfect but consistent system, where judges follow set laws – even if that means that rulings will generally not be perfectly just.

This nevertheless can yield unjust results. Legal loopholes or outdated provisions may allow harmful conduct to go unpunished, and certain wrongs may escape the court’s reach because they are rare, hard to define, or difficult to prove. Although there are measures to try and deal with some of these problems – some of which I discuss here – no human legal system can ever achieve absolute perfection.

Moreover, because courts are bound by procedural fairness, they can inadvertently reward manipulation. Someone who lies or cheats may gain an advantage in court, while an honest person may find themselves at a disadvantage.

God Pursuing Justice

Because courts are not always adequate, God intervenes to uphold justice where human systems fall short. Certain categories of wrongdoing are left unaddressed. In such cases, we often find the phrase: “he is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven.”¹⁰

This principle appears in multiple contexts. For example, the court may exempt someone from paying damages due to legal technicalities. One such case is where a person commits an act that carries both capital and financial liability. According to halacha, the court will only try him for the more severe offense. If a person caused financial loss to another while committing a capital crime, the court does not prosecute the lesser, monetary offense. Though this legal exemption is correct from a procedural standpoint, one could argue that the individual still owes compensation for the damage caused. The court does not enforce this payment – but it remains an obligation before Heaven.

Where a lesser penalty, such as a fine, is merged in the larger penalty for the same offense and will not therefore be recoverable, it is sometimes held that in order to satisfy divine law (Dinei Shamayim) as well as human law and not be liable to future divine retribution, one should pay also the lesser penalty, especially where it is payable to the victim.¹¹
– Encyclopaedia Judaica

The phrase – “exempt according to human law, but liable according to the laws of Heaven” – is also used in cases where a person causes damage indirectly. Halachically, indirect damage often exempts a person from financial liability, even when the harm is clear. Examples of such scenarios include: Removing a cushion from under a falling object, causing it to break on the ground.¹² Opening the door of a stable and allowing animals to run away.¹³ Hiring false witnesses.¹⁴ Placing poison near another person’s animal.¹⁵

In all these cases,¹⁶ the individual caused quantifiable harm but is technically exempt because the damage was not caused directly. Still, since the person’s actions clearly led to loss,¹⁷ he remains morally and spiritually obligated to compensate the victim. The court cannot enforce this, but the obligation is binding in the Heavenly court.

A related concept appears in cases of passive damage – such as when a person refrains from testifying in court and thereby causes another to suffer a loss.¹⁸ Though not actively causing harm, the failure to act creates an ethical liability that, while not enforceable by the court, is still recognized in the eyes of Heaven.

In all these cases, the Tosefta (Shevuot 3:2) teaches that although he bears no legal obligation to pay, “Heaven will not forgive him until he pays up.”¹⁹

We also find a related, though not identical,²⁰ concept: where a person is ‘not liable at all’ in the legal sense, yet ‘If he desires to fulfill his moral and spiritual obligations,’ – or as the Talmud puts it, “where he comes to fulfill his obligation to Heaven”²¹ ‘he is liable to make restitution.’²² This applies in cases such as when a person no longer remembers from whom he stole²³ or to whom he owes money,²⁴ or is unsure whether a debt was repaid.²⁵

While the courts do not formally enforce these cases, such damages are still recognized as legitimate obligations.²⁶ In fact, the court is required to inform the individual that he remains morally obligated to repay the debt, as it is binding under Heavenly law.²⁷

This may even carry practical legal consequences. For instance, if the claimant seizes an item or had previously taken collateral and now seeks to keep it as compensation, some authorities hold that since the value of the damage has already reached the injured party, the court may allow him to retain it. Although the court does not actively enforce payment in such cases, it likewise does not reverse compensation that has already been obtained.²⁸

In some cases, the court might even enforce payment for these indirect forms of financial harm, invoking the authority of Heavenly justice in doing so.²⁹

In an article I wrote in Hungarian about obligations in the Heavenly court,³⁰ I proposed that the earthly court functions as an instrument of divine justice. Wherever the court falls short, nature itself steps in to punish and reward, maintaining a cosmic balance that ultimately brings about justice. This might be the meaning behind “liable according to the laws of Heaven.”

God Executes Justice Through Nature

God carries out His will through the natural world. When He interacts with human affairs, He often does so via the forces of nature.This idea is alluded to in various biblical verses – for example, Psalms 148:8 speaks of “storm wind that executes His command,”³¹ and Psalms 104:4 says, “He makes the winds His messengers, fiery flames His servants.”³²

The Talmud (Taanit 18b) echoes this concept, teaching:

And we are not wholly righteous, and have been condemned to destruction by the Omnipresent for our sins. And if you do not kill us, the Omnipresent has many other executioners. And if men do not kill us, the Omnipresent has many bears and lions in His world that can hurt us and kill us.³³

Similarly, Vayikra Rabbah 22:2 states:

The Holy One blessed be He said to the prophets: ‘If you do not perform my mission, I have many messengers’… I can accomplish My mission with anything. Rabbi Aḥa said: The Holy One blessed be He accomplishes His mission with anything, even by means of a snake, even by means of a frog, even by means of a scorpion, and even by means of a gnat.³⁴

Building on these sources, Rabbi Ben-Zion Meir Hai Uziel explained that all of creation – unknowingly – becomes God’s messenger in carrying out His judgments upon human beings.³⁵

Sin Is Regulated by Nature

In ancient times, the Jewish high court – the Sanhedrin – was responsible for administering capital punishment. However, by Talmudic times, these powers could no longer be exercised, leaving what appears to be a gap in the justice system. Yet the Sages taught that Divine justice continues to operate, even when the courts are unable to act. Rav Yosef and Rabbi Ḥiyya taught:

From the day that the Temple was destroyed, although the Sanhedrin was abolished the four death penalties were not abolished? The Gemara asks: Were they not abolished? It is clear that they were abolished, as today there is neither Sanhedrin nor capital punishment. Rather, it means that although there are no court-imposed executions, the punishment of the four death penalties was not abolished. How so? One who was liable to be executed by stoning either falls from the roof or a beast tramples him. That is similar to stoning, which involves being pushed off an elevated place and then stoned. And one who was liable to be executed by burning either falls into a conflagration or a snake bites him, which creates a burning sensation. And one who was liable to be executed by decapitation is either handed over to the ruling monarchy for execution by sword, or bandits attack and kill him. And one who was liable to be executed by strangulation either drowns in a river, or dies of diphtheria.³⁶
– Sotah 8b

God brings about justice through the workings of nature. Although human courts no longer carry out capital punishment, sinners are not let off the hook. Divine justice continues to operate, and the appropriate consequences are still brought about through seemingly natural means.

We are commanded to pursue justice, but God does not rely solely on human systems. He designed the world with a built-in moral code – a natural order in which righteousness is met with reward, and unethical behavior with punishment.

Measure for Measure

The Talmud in Sotah (8b) both precedes and follows this passage with the principle of measure for measure:

Rav Yosef says: Although the measure with regard to court-imposed capital punishment has ceased, as there is no court today empowered to adjudicate and apply corporal punishment, punishment that is suitable to be applied with a measure by God has not ceased, as a person is punished by Heaven in accordance with his sin…
…It is taught in a baraita in the Tosefta (3:1–5) that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would say: From where is it derived that with the measure that a person measures, he is measured with it? As it is stated…³⁷

The Talmud insists that true justice is not simply about punishment, but about fitting punishment – the right consequence for the right act. Even when divine justice operates through the natural order, it adheres to this principle: the response is measured precisely to match the wrongdoing. The Heavenly system reflects the ideal that human courts are meant to aspire to. In the same spirit, Heaven punishes according to the measure-for-measure model, where the outcome mirrors the deed.

But when humans regulate punishment, perfect proportionality is never achieved. Though there may be more ideal forms of justice than a legal system, the courts are to refrain from pursuing it – it can lead to disastrous consequences. The Torah presents the ideal of proportional justice through the concept of lex talionis – “an eye for an eye.” This reflects the vision that punishment should neither exceed nor fall short of the offense.³⁸

There is a deep, even poetic, beauty in this model of measure for measure. It evokes a kind of moral symmetry – like bending a paper in the opposite direction to flatten it. When a person is punished in the very manner they wronged others, there is a sense of justice that is fair. A divine act of ‘art’ in judgment.³⁹

Yet human courts cannot enact this literally. The Torah’s “eye for an eye,” as interpreted by the Sages, refers to monetary compensation, not physical retaliation. Human courts are limited and cannot deliver precisely proportionate justice, there is a need for divine correction. God intervenes to ensure that ultimate fairness is achieved, even beyond the reach of human judgment.

We see from Bereshit Rabbah 9:11 that even though all other Divine attributes have been nullified, the attribute of measure for measure remains fully intact:

All the [original divine] measures are now void, but the [principle of] measure for measure has not been voided. Rav Huna said in the name of Rabbi Yosei: From the beginning of the creation of the world, the Holy One blessed be He foresaw [the principle] that in accordance with the measure that a person metes out for others, so is it meted out for him. That is why the Sages said: “And behold it was very good” – this is the attribute of beneficence.⁴⁰

It seems that the principle of measure-for-measure is embedded in the very fabric of creation. It is the mechanism by which the world is wired to function. Nature operates according to a karma-like form of moral cause and effect – rewarding and punishing not only in general terms, but in ways that are directly correlated to one’s actions. If a transgression is committed through water, for example, the punishment may come through water. If someone causes others to wait, their consequence may involve delay. Rabbinic literature is rich with examples of this precise correspondence, where the details of one’s actions are mirrored in the outcomes they later experience.

Karmic Measure for Measure

This talmudic discussion is based on the following Mishnah (Sotah 1:7):

With the measure that a person measures, he is measured with it. For example, she, the sota, adorned herself to violate a transgression, the Omnipresent therefore decreed that she be rendered unattractive; she exposed herself for the purpose of violating a transgression, as she stood in places where she would be noticed by potential adulterers, so the Omnipresent therefore decreed that her body be exposed publicly; she began her transgression with her thigh and afterward with her stomach, therefore the thigh is smitten first and then the stomach, and the rest of all her body does not escape punishment.⁴¹

The Mishnah then continues with further examples, illustrating how both reward and punishment follow this principle:

Samson followed his eyes, therefore he was punished measure for measure, as the Philistines gouged out his eyes… Absalom was excessively proud of his hair, and therefore he was hanged by his hair. And furthermore, because he engaged in sexual intercourse with ten of his father’s concubines (see II Samuel 15:16 and 16:22), therefore ten spears [loneviyyot] were put, i.e., thrust, into him… And because he stole three times, committing three thefts of people’s hearts: The heart of his father, as he tricked him by saying that he was going to sacrifice offerings; the heart of the court, as he tricked them into following him; and the heart of the Jewish people… therefore three spears were embedded into his heart…
…And the same is so with regard to the reward of good deeds; a person is rewarded measure for measure. Miriam waited for the baby Moses for one hour at the shore of the Nile… Therefore the Jewish people delayed their travels in the desert for seven days to wait for her when she was smitten with leprosy… Joseph merited to bury his father, resulting in a display of great honor to his father, and there was none among his brothers greater than he in importance, for he was viceroy of Egypt… Who, to us, had a greater burial than Joseph, as it was none other than Moses who involved himself in transporting his coffin. Moses merited to be the only person involved in the transportation of Joseph’s bones to be buried in Eretz Yisrael, and there was none among the Jewish people greater than he... Who had a greater burial than Moses, as no one involved himself in his burial other than the Omnipresent Himself.

This pattern recurs throughout rabbinic literature – sometimes the consequences appear immediately, other times they unfold over time. In certain cases, the very act a person committed becomes the instrument of their downfall – like Haman, who was hanged on the very gallows he had prepared for Mordechai.⁴²

The Talmud (Nedarim 32a) states:

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Anyone who divines, i.e., he guesses and looks for signs about the future, the sign will injure him, as it is stated… Rather, the reason that he will be injured is not based on the verse but rather due to the concept of measure for measure: Since he attempts to tell his fortune, it injures him.⁴³

This is the ideal form of justice. And because of this, it is the model by which God governs the world. Human courts, however, generally do not operate this way. Yet in certain exceptional cases, even human justice has reflected this divine symmetry.⁴⁴

As explained, nature operates within a perfect system – part of God’s greater plan to orchestrate a just and harmonious order, in which the wicked are punished and the righteous rewarded in a manner that is symmetrical, proportionate, and ultimately just.

Financial Equilibrium

The verse in Proverbs (28:20) states:

The man of faith will receive an abundance of blessings.⁴⁵

This verse can be understood as referring to someone who conducts their business with integrity and trust in God⁴⁶.⁴⁷ As Rabbi Israel Alnaqua explains,⁴⁸ through honest dealings and upright conduct, such a person earns the trust of others – who in turn are more likely to invest in him, lend to him, and support his ventures. In this way, ethical business conduct becomes a channel for financial success.

The Talmud (Niddah 70b) teaches:

The sages of Alexandria asked: What should a person do to become wealthy? Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: He should increase his time involved in merchandise and conduct his business faithfully…
…prayer, without that, being involved in honest business, does not suffice.⁴⁹

Rabbi Saadya Gaon,⁵⁰ and others⁵¹ explain that one should never assume they are losing by being honest. If someone were to cheat, any apparent gain would be illusory and ultimately unsustainable.

This theme recurs throughout rabbinic literature. For instance, the Talmud (Bava Metzia 71a) teaches:

It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Concerning anyone who has money and lends it without interest, the verse says about him: “He who has not given his money with interest and who has not taken a bribe against the innocent, he who does these shall never collapse” (Psalms 15:5). From this statement, the opposite can also be inferred: You learn from this that concerning anyone who lends his money to others with interest, his property, i.e., his financial standing, collapses.⁵²

We find this principle echoed in many other financial transgressions⁵³ – such as the laws concerning dishonest weights and measures.⁵⁴ The Talmud (Bava Batra 89a) teaches:

Rav Yehuda of Sura says a homiletic interpretation of the phrase: “You shall not have in your house diverse measures” (Deuteronomy 25:14): “You shall not have in your house” means that you will become a pauper, who has nothing in his house. What is the reason for this? It is due to the fact that you used diverse measures, buying with a large vessel and selling with a small one.
The phrase: “You shall not have in your purse diverse weights” (Deuteronomy 25:13), is interpreted in a similar fashion: “You shall not have in your purse,” i.e., you will become a pauper, who has nothing in his purse. What is the reason for this? It is due to the fact that you used diverse weights. But if you possess only “a perfect and just weight,” then “you shall have” wealth. Likewise, if you possess only “a perfect and just measure,” then “you shall have” wealth.⁵⁵

At first glance, unethical business practices might appear profitable. But the Torah insists: they are not. God ensures that everything balances out. The honest person is not shortchanged; he is compensated. The dishonest person, even if he appears to profit, ultimately loses. The money always ends up where it should, and there is a perfect, just system to all this.

The Talmud (Sanhedrin 8a), commenting on the verse “Do not show favor in judgement… for justice belongs to God”⁵⁶ (Deut. 1:17), teaches:

“For the judgment is God’s.” Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: The Holy One, Blessed be He, says: It is not enough for the wicked judges, that they take money from this person and they give it to that person unlawfully, but they even trouble Me to return the money to its rightful owners. As proper justice is ultimately in the hands of God, He takes responsibility to bring about the rectification of the errors of unfit judges.⁵⁷

Everything, in the end, comes into balance.⁵⁸ An innate moral equilibrium seems woven into the fabric of creation, ensuring that unfair gain is eventually redressed. This divinely‑rooted justice erodes any real incentive for dishonesty and steers commerce toward integrity. In this way, justice ultimately rests in God’s hands.

Your Concerns Take Precedence Over Those of Everyone Else

The Mishnah (Bava Metzia 2:11) discusses the obligation to return lost objects. When someone finds a lost item, he is required to return it to its rightful owner. However, if a person finds two objects – one belonging to himself and one to someone else – and he cannot carry both, he is not obligated to prioritize the other’s item, even if it belongs to his father or teacher:

If one finds his lost item and his father’s lost item, tending to his own lost item takes precedence. Similarly, if one finds his lost item and his teacher’s lost item, tending to his own lost item takes precedence.⁵⁹

Commenting in this Mishnah, the Talmud (Bava Metzia 33a) introduces a striking principle.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: “The verse states ‘There shall be no poor among you’ (Devarim 15:4) – this teaches that your concerns take precedence over those of everyone else.”⁶⁰

Legally, a person is allowed to prioritize his own interests. But the Talmud then adds a cautionary note:

But Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: One who fulfills this for himself will eventually come to this.

The Ben Ish Chai, commenting on this passage, shares a parable to illustrate the ethical message. He quotes a story from Rabbi Elijah ben Solomon Abraham ha-Kohen,⁶¹ a similar version of this story was later popularized by the Brothers Grimm:⁶²

A man once cast his elderly father out of the house, leaving him to live among the homeless. One cold day, the man’s young son passed by the street and saw his grandfather shivering. The grandfather asked him to bring a coat. The boy rushed home, and his father sent him to the attic to fetch an old, worn coat. The boy took the coat – but tore it in half.

“Why did you tear the coat?” his father asked.

The boy replied, “I’m saving the other half for when I grow up and send you out of the house. When my son sees you on the street and asks for a coat, I’ll give him the rest.”

The Ben Ish Chai explains that this story captures the message of the Talmudic passage. If a person lives only by the principle of prioritizing themselves, they teach that value to the next generation. In turn, they will one day be on the receiving end of that same logic. What goes around comes around.

This is especially poignant in the context of the Talmud’s example: a person choosing between their own financial interest and their father’s. The Talmud affirms a legal right to self-prioritization – but it also warns of the consequences of living by that rule.

James Baldwin famously wrote:⁶³

Children have never been very good at listening to their elders, but they have never failed to imitate them.

Rabbi Elijah ben Solomon Abraham ha-Kohen writes⁶⁴ that when a person honors and respects their parents, God rewards him by giving him children who will, in turn, honor him. He adds that this may be the deeper meaning behind the Torah’s promise that one who honors their parents will be granted a long life. Since their children will follow in their righteous path, it is as if their life continues even after death.

The Ibn Ezra explains, based on the wording of the verse “ya’arichun” – “it will lengthen [your days]” – that the mitzvah itself directly causes one’s life to be prolonged.⁶⁵ There are many possible explanations for how this might occur. For example: parents may pray for a child who honors them;⁶⁶ or someone who cares for their parents may receive reciprocal care and support – perhaps even beyond what is obligated – creating a relationship that is mutually beneficial to both parents and children.⁶⁷

However, there seems to be a much simpler, more straightforward explanation. In a society where children care for their parents, people live longer. When someone teaches their children to honor and care for parents, they are shaping a world in which they themselves will one day be cared for. This mitzvah sustains not only individuals, but entire generations. In honoring our parents, we actively build a culture that values life – and prolongs it.⁶⁸

Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, commenting on this reward, writes:

In a society in which the elder generation is respected, people will live long lives, as aging parents can be confident that they can rely on the younger generation to care for them, and they will feel valued as important members of the family and of society at large.⁶⁹

Mitzvot Help

Many mitzvot carry a reward that unfolds in the natural course of life. Regarding charity, the Torah promises: “Thou shalt surely give him, and thy heart shall not be grieved when thou givest to him: because for this thing the Lord thy God shall bless thee in all thy works, and in all that to which thou puttest thy hand.”⁷⁰ Proverbs echoes this sentiment: “charity rescues from death.”⁷¹ The Talmud even recounts a case in which a person’s life was saved by the merit of charity.⁷²

We are commanded to give ten percent of our income to charity.⁷³ The Talmud (Taanit 9a) states: ““A tithe shall you tithe [te’aser]” (Deuteronomy 14:22)? This phrase can be interpreted homiletically: Take a tithe [asser] so that you will become wealthy [titasher].”⁷⁴

The Talmud teaches that one who gives charity is considered as if he has lent to God—making God, so to speak, indebted to him.⁷⁵

As explained, honoring one’s parents, refraining from theft, and conducting business with integrity are all mitzvot that ultimately benefit the individual. The same is true for charity: a society in which people treat each other with kindness and help one another in times of need is ultimately better for everyone. Supporting the poor may seem like a loss in the short term, but it pays off even economically in the long run.

Though it may seem counterintuitive, a person actually gains from giving charity and living in a community where others do the same.

Pirkei Avot 5:10 teaches:

One that says: “mine is mine, and yours is yours”: this is a commonplace type; and some say this is a sodom-type of character.⁷⁶

Rabbi Moshe Avigdor Amiel offers a homiletic reading of the Mishnah.⁷⁷ It begins: “One that says, ‘Mine is mine and yours is yours’ – this is a commonplace type.” In an ideal community, everyone helps one another. But if only a few individuals adopt this stance of strict self‑interest, the society can still function – though at an ordinary, less‑than‑ideal level. The Mishnah adds: “and some say – this is a sodom-type of character.” The phrase some say signals that the outlook has become widespread. When many people adopt “mine is mine and yours is yours” as a civic norm, the community takes on Sodom‑like traits and, like Sodom, is ultimately destined to collapse.

Many laws in the Torah create a society in which, when upheld, the collective well-being flourishes. These laws establish a framework where cooperation, generosity, and integrity uplift not only the individual, but the community as a whole. People often focus on short-term gain, overlooking the long-term value embedded in ethical conduct. Gain is often counterintuitive: acts of kindness and charity, which may appear to be sacrifices, frequently prove to be rewarding investments.

Reciprocal Altruism: A Rational Perspective

A system where nature enforces reciprocal justice – where charity leads to wealth and honesty brings success – can sound mystical or difficult to digest. But these concepts can also be understood through reason. There is a rational way to understand how nature incentivizes and promotes kindness.

Charles Darwin, when discussing the origins of human morality, wrote:

In the first place, as the reasoning powers and foresight of the members became improved, each man would soon learn from experience that if he aided his fellow-men, he would commonly receive aid in return. From this low motive he might acquire the habit of aiding his fellows; and the habit of performing benevolent actions certainly strengthens the feeling of sympathy, which gives the first impulse to benevolent actions. Habits, moreover, followed during many generations probably tend to be inherited.⁷⁸

In The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins explains a fundamental flaw in a system where people are kind without any expectation of return. Imagine two types of individuals: “suckers,” who offer kindness indiscriminately, and “cheaters,” who exploit that kindness without ever reciprocating. Cheaters will always take advantage of suckers, eventually driving them to extinction. But a society made up solely of cheaters would also collapse, since it lacks the benefits of mutual cooperation.

Dawkins suggests a third type: the “grudgers.” These individuals practice kindness, but only on the condition that it is returned. For example, if two animals rely on each other to remove parasites, one will help the other only if that help is reciprocated. If not, the kindness stops. Unlike suckers and cheaters, a population of grudgers is stable – it fosters cooperation while protecting against exploitation.

This idea points to a deeper principle: mutual, conditional kindness is a natural form of justice. Those who give receive in return. In this way, justice is literally embedded in the structure of nature, and it naturally encourages more kindness. One could argue that God designed a world governed by this principle – a built-in moral system that rewards kindness with kindness. It is through mechanisms like this that the world becomes, ultimately, a more just and compassionate place.

We find a similar idea in game theory:

People generally act rationally – they make choices that will best serve their interests. However, when outcomes depend on how others behave, uncertainty can lead people to choose the safer option, even when a better outcome might be possible. This is illustrated famously in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

In this scenario, two prisoners are interrogated separately. If both remain silent, they receive only light sentences. If one testifies against the other while the other remains silent, the cooperating prisoner goes free while the other receives a heavy sentence. If both betray each other, they both receive moderate sentences. The rational move, from a self-protective standpoint, is to cooperate with the authorities, out of fear the other might do the same. Yet ironically, if both chose silence, they’d each be better off.

The problem lies in the fact that this is a one-time game. In real life, particularly within stable communities, people interact repeatedly. When relationships are ongoing, cooperation becomes far more attractive. Over time, trust and strategies emerge that maximize mutual benefit and reduce the risk of betrayal.

If the Prisoner’s Dilemma were repeated, both parties would likely recognize the value of sustained cooperation. They’d develop patterns and expectations – essentially a social contract – that allow both to benefit in the long run.⁷⁹

A good example of this dynamic is the game of “Chicken.” In this game, two cars race toward each other on a collision course. If neither swerves or stops, both crash – a clearly disastrous outcome for both. The best outcome occurs if one swerves and the other continues, but the dilemma lies in the fact that neither wants to be the one to back down.

If this game is played only once, the safest strategy for both would be to stop, avoiding the risk of a crash. However, in a rational society where such interactions occur repeatedly, the solution is to establish a shared system: one swerves this time, the other next time. With rules and mutual understanding in place, both parties avoid disaster and benefit over the long term. The Talmud (Sanhedrin 32b) states:

As it is taught in a baraita: When the verse states: “Justice, justice, shall you follow,” one mention of “justice” is stated with regard to judgment and one is stated with regard to compromise. How so? Where there are two boats traveling on the river and they encounter each other, if both of them attempt to pass, both of them sink, as the river is not wide enough for both to pass. If they pass one after the other, both of them pass. And similarly, where there are two camels who were ascending the ascent of Beit Ḥoron, where there is a narrow steep path, and they encounter each other, if both of them attempt to ascend, both of them fall. If they ascend one after the other, both of them ascend.
How does one decide which of them should go first? If there is one boat that is laden and one boat that is not laden, the needs of the one that is not laden should be overridden due to the needs of the one that is laden. If there is one boat that is close to its destination and one boat that is not close to its destination, the needs of the one that is close should be overridden due to the needs of the one that is not close. If both of them were close to their destinations, or both of them were far from their destinations, impose a compromise between them to decide which goes first, and the owners of the boats pay a fee to one other, i.e., the owners of the first boat compensate the owner of the boat that waits, for any loss incurred.⁸⁰

The Talmud outlines a fair and reasonable system, even going so far as to compensate the ship that waits. Still, no system can guarantee that both parties “win” in every instance – someone will have to yield. Yet it remains in the best interest of the ship that waits to accept this minor loss, because the existence of such a system ultimately protects him as well. In fact, even in the moment, it is better to wait a few extra minutes than to risk a crash.

Mutual cooperation tends to prevail in the long run.

The world appears to be structured in such a way that people ultimately receive back what they give. Honest business conduct fosters trust and builds a solid reputation, which in turn leads to long-term success. Those who are reliable and principled often fare better over time than those who cut corners or cheat for short-term gain.
A similar principle holds true for theft: in a society where stealing becomes profitable, no one is truly secure, as everyone lives in fear of being stolen from. By contrast, living by a shared ethical code benefits not only others, but ourselves as well. Nature – remarkably – seems to regulate this kind of justice on its own, creating a natural incentive for ethical business conduct.

This is the idea of reciprocal altruism – cooperation that, over time, benefits all participants. Yet beyond this, there’s also value in absolute altruism, where acts of kindness aren’t transactional, but contribute to the kind of society we all want to live in.

Take, for example, holding the door for someone. I don’t expect that specific person to return the favor – but I uphold a norm that makes the world more courteous and cooperative. And because others uphold it too, someone will eventually hold the door for me. Charity works similarly. I don’t give because I expect direct repayment, but because I want to help build a society where people care for one another. Such a society is more stable, less plagued by poverty, and more economically productive – and everyone, including the giver, benefits as a result.

Respecting elders, caring for parents, giving charity – these mitzvot create a culture of dignity, generosity, and shared responsibility. In a society where people care for the elderly, I too will be cared for when I age. In this way, even absolute altruism finds its way back.

Trevor’s Death

Trevor’s kindness eventually found its way back to him. This reflects a natural system of moral cause and effect – one through which God brings about justice within the world. But this system depends on the cooperation of others. Because it relies on human reciprocity, there is always a risk that someone might exploit it. In the long run, such people rarely benefit, while those who act with integrity usually do. Still, this structure is not perfect, it depends on human cooperation, and there will inevitably be moments when someone suffers despite doing the right thing.

From a mystical perspective, we might explain such outcomes by saying that the person fulfilled their mission in this world, or that there are hidden reasons beyond our grasp. But such explanations are not examples of justice unfolding naturally through the world.

Talmudinfo

2
See for instance Rashi.
3
See for instance Isaac Samuel Reggio, in his commentary on the verse. “For justice is the foundation of all, and if crime increases in the land, the state will be brought to ruin”
4
A similar principle could be found in Sefer HaChinukh, 229 (translated by R. Francis Nataf, Sefaria 2018) regarding the sin of robbing:
“The root of the commandment is well-known, as it is something that the intellect distances greatly. And it is fitting to distance it, since the one who robs one weaker than he, knows that when one more powerful than he comes upon him, he will also be robbed, etc. And it is a reason for the destruction of civilization. ”
5
Proverbs 21:21, trans. The Rashi Ketuvim by Rabbi Shraga Silverstein.
6
See for instance; Mishneh Torah, The Sanhedrin and the Penalties within Their Jurisdiction 1:1.
7
Deuteronomy 16:18, Metsudah Publications, 2009.
8
Sefaria Community Translation. See also the Talmud in Sanhedrin 56b.
9
Sanhedrin 6b, The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).
“And lest the judge say: What value is there for me with this suffering? Why should I engage in such a burdensome and difficult task? The verse states: “He is with you in giving judgment,” from which it is derived that in rendering his decision, a judge has only that which his eyes see. He is enjoined to render the best judgment possible based on the information he has available, and he is not accountable for anything else.”
10
Bava Kamma 56a The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).
11
“Divine Punishment.” Encyclopaedia Judaica.
12
See the commentators to Bava Kamma 26b, and see Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 386:3 (Sefaria Community Translation), in the Remah, that even if the one that threw it removed the pillow, he is not liable: “So too, one who throws his own vessel off the roof and there were pillows and blankets beneath them, in a manner that if [the vessel] fell onto them they wouldn’t break, and another person removed [the pillows] before [the vessels landed] and the vessels hit the ground and broke. The one who removed [the pillows] must pay [the damages]. So too for all similar cases.” the Remah adds “…Therefore, even if one threw [another’s] vessel from the roof while there were pillows beneath them and he himself removed the pillows, yet he is exempt [in court]. He is not liable for the throw because it wouldn’t break through this action. The removal [of the pillows] is but a causal damage.”
13
See Bava Kamma 55b, and Tur, Choshen Mishpat 386 (and in the name of his father, the Rosh), and Arukh HaShulchan, Choshen Mishpat 386.
14
See Bava Kamma 55b, and Ketzot HaChoshen on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 32:1, Arukh HaShulchan, Choshen Mishpat 386.
15
See Bava Kamma 56a, and Tur, Arukh HaShulchan, Choshen Mishpat 386.
16
Indirect harm has far reaching ramifications, for instance during the covid pandemic, there was a discussion regarding someone contagious that spreads the virus on to someone else, whether it can be classified as indirect harm, and therefore not penalizable in court, see for instance Kobetz Hearot Ubiurim, Oholei Torah, issue 1179, 5780, (gilyon 11, Shavuot), from p. 112.
17
It would seem that there is a correlation between the intent and the obligation. It could be argued that when someone caused indirect damage unintentionally, he is not obligated to repay it in the heavenly court, see for instance; Teshuvot Maharit, Vol. 1, 95, and see Tel Talpiot journal, issue 66, p. 249 that it would seem that some authorities would not agree with this, while others would.
18
Bava Kamma 55b, Arukh HaShulchan, Choshen Mishpat 386. And see Rabbi Akiva Eiger on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 28, on seif 1, that he quotes ‘rishonim’ that hold that one is even liable in human court, and that the a defendant can rely on their opinion (‘kim li’).
19
Translation from the Jerusalem Talmud, Bava Kamma 6:1, Heinrich W. Guggenheimer, 1999-2015.
20
See Shaarei Yosher, Shaar 5, chapter 16. And see there that he differentiates between when someone is obligated to repay just legal authorities don’t try him, like where he also committed a heavier crime, to where to begin with courts don’t try him. He also argues, that when he forgot if he repaid, since the person who lent him claims he did not, and in that event he owes him money even according to human courts, it is a legitimate payment, and he fulfills the mitzvah of repaying a debt, however if someone is not at all obligated in human courts, like – he argues – when someone does not testify, there is no debt according to human court at all.
21
Bava Kamma 118a, The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).
22
Mishneh Torah, Plaintiff and Defendant 1:9, Trans. by Eliyahu Touger, Moznaim Publishing.
23
Bava Metzia 37a.
24
Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 76:3, “v’yesh omrim.”
25
Bava Kamma 118a.
26
It would seem that some authorities do not accept this understanding, and believe that there is no legal obligation to pay at all, see for instance the Rashba (and brought in Shita Mekubetzet) on Bava Metzia 91a, it would seem that the first opinion he bringst would think like this, and see Turei Even, Chagigah 11a (Avnei Shoham).
27
See Yam Shel Shlomo, Baba Kama 6:6, and see Shut Maharam Mintz 101, and also regarding enforcing it, that however is a bigger topic, and see footnote 77 in the Yam Shel Shlomo (Machon Mishnat Rabbi Aharon).
28
In a case where someone is exempt from paying someone, because he also committed another offense besides the one he owes money for, and the penalty for that one is more severe; since he is only punished for that greater offense, the court can not compel him to pay for the lesser offense. If however the party seeking the compensation would ‘grab’ the amount they deserve compensation for, Rashi (Bava Metzia 91a “Rava amar”) writes that he does not need to return it.

While there are some rabbis who do not agree with this, for instance; Turei Even, Chagigah 11a (Avnei Shoham) [see also the first explanation in Rashi, and the Rashba (and brought in Shita Mekubetzet) on Bava Metzia 91a, who might also not accept this], rashi’s opinion is generally accepted.

Some however understand this to only apply if the heavier punishment was not carried out, if however the heavier punishment was carried out this would not apply, (Ketzot HaChoshen, 28:1), and others don’t accept this distinction (Netivot HaMishpat, 28 Beurim 2). The argument could be made that ‘grabbing’ only applies when the person carried out a crime for which he would normally pay, and should pay, and is נפטר because of legal technicalities that being that he also committed a heavier crime and is only tried for that one, but if he originally caused damage in an indirect manner, since such an offense is not enforceable by court, and one would not be obligated to pay in court at all, if the other party ‘grabs’ the value he would need to return it (Siftei Kohen on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat

28:2 (the opinion of the Maharshal), and see Havot Yair 45, and he quotes a Rivash).

Some understand this however to apply to all heavenly obligations, thus ‘grabbing’ would be work, see for instance; Maharach Or Zarua Responsa 229 (Maharach Or Zarua Responsa digest, trans. by Noah Goldstein, Yeshiva University, 1959): “Nevertheless the damage caused by B, fall under the heading of Garama (damages caused indirectly) for which one is not directly responsible, [but is liable to be fined]. However, property of B that was seized by A as compensation for the loss he sustained as a result of the former’s action, can not be exacted from the latter.” And it would seem this way also from Maharam Mintz 101, 94b. And see Rabbi Akiva Eiger, Choshen Mishpat 28 on Shach, “vchen katav Rivash,” it seems like it is a dispute amongst ‘Rishonim’ and therefore the defendant might be able to rely on those, ‘kim li’.

Others make different distinctions, for instance in Shevut Yaakov 146, he cites himself from his book Mishptei Yaakov, where he differentiates between rabbinic and biblical obligations to pay. For more distinctions, see for instance Tumim 28:4, he mentions that when the obligation for heaven is not definite ‘grabbing’ does not help. And see Marcheshet Vol. 2, 23, 3:9, that it might depend on what is being seized, money (or similarly, the object which he is owed), in which case the ‘grabbing’ would be effective, but ‘grabbing’ a different object as collateral would not be effective. And see Chokhmat Shlomo on Choshen Mishpat 28 seif 1, that it is only effective, if he originally ‘grabbed’ it with clear intent of seizing it for this debt.
29
There are certain laws, where someone does not have to pay according to strict confines of the law, like if someone finds a lost object in a place where the owner would probably not get it back, like a city with a non jewish majority, strict law would not obligate him to return the object to its owner, but it is right for him to return it nonetheless, to follow ‘the spirit of the law.’ In cases like this often the court might enforce it, like if the person who found it is rich (Siftei Kohen on Choshen Mishpat 259:3), similarly, if the person who found it is poor, and the owner who lost it is rich, he does not need to do the ‘lifnim mishurat hadin’ and therefore does not need to return it (Remah Choshen Mishpat 259:5).

Many laws are not obligatory under strict confines of the law, and are in this category; ‘lifnim mishurat hadin,’ the Remah bringst an argument in Choshen Mishpat 12:2 (Chaim N. Denburg, Montreal, 1955) regarding its enforcement: “The Court of Law cannot compel one to fall in with [the principle of equity, i.e., actting] beyond the requirements of the line of justice, although that would appear to them to be the proper thing [to do]. However, some differ with [this opinion].” [And see Beur HaGra on Choshen Mishpat, 312:10.] And see Pitchei Teshuva, Tumim there, that one could enforce it with words, and see Heshiv Moshe, Yoreh Deah, end of 48, that the court has the right to act is it thinks will benefit, and the court could enforce rich people, but also non rich people if the court thinks it’s necessary or that he can afford it, similarly, if it is not a financial matter, they would enforce a poor person too (and see also Tzemach Tzedek (Krochmal) 89).

Similar logic might apply to the laws for which one is obligated if he wants to fulfill his obligation in the court of heaven (see for instance; Nachlat David, (Tebil) Zichron Tzadik in the beginning of the book).
30
See here, and see also Tzuriel Asaf, Torah Hachayim, Journal from Yeshivat Torat Hachayim, year: 5782, p. 218, he makes a similar point.
31
JPS, 1985.
32
JPS, 1985.
33
The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).
34
The Sefaria Midrash Rabbah, 2022.
35
Hegyonei Uziel Vol. 1, p. 277.
36
The translation is from Ketubot 30a, The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz). However this is also found in Sotah 8b, and elsewhere (like Sanhedrin 37b).
37
The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).
38
In the book, Beit Din Makin Veonshin by Aaron Kirschenbaum, this idea is discussed at length, from chapter 25, and specifically from chapter 26.
39
See however what Emmanuel Lavinas wrote, in Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism from p. 146, he explains that ‘eye for an eye’ ends the cycle of violence, as opposed to a monetary punishment, which doesn’t, as it fails to properly punish the rich.
40
The Sefaria Midrash Rabbah, 2022.
41
The translation is from The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz), Sotah 8b.
42
The verse in Esther 7:10 (JPS 1917) states: “So they hanged Haman on the gallows that he had prepared for Mordecai.”

There are many examples and forms and ways in which we see the idea of measure for measure, see for instance Esther Kapa, Sinai journal, issue 141, p. 150. There are books written that compile such a phenomena throughout the bible, for instance the book Umidotai Peulatam. There are also many indeas in the Torah that seem to correlate with a similar idea, for instance, the idea of ‘ayin hara’ evil eye, one who gives an ayin hara to his fellow he would get hurt by it, see regarding this in Ayin Hara B’ein Hayahadut, chapter 22.

There also is a cycle to measure for measure, for instance, Pirkei Avot 2:6 (Dr. Joshua Kulp): “Moreover he saw a skull floating on the face of the water. He said to it: because you drowned others, they drowned you. And in the end, they that drowned you will be drowned.”

The idea of measure for measure seems to be a guarantee, and to everyone, it says in Bamidbar Rabbah 14:6 (The Sefaria Midrash Rabbah, 2022) after mentioning the idea that people will still receive the punishment despite the Sanhedrin no longer existing, by natural means: “a person cannot escape the judgment of the Holy One blessed be He that He will not punish him measure for measure.”

This idea of measure for measure comes up many times in the Talmud, we even find different sources for it.

The Talmud in Sotah 8b (The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).) states “It is taught in a baraita in the Tosefta (3:1–5) that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would say: From where is it derived that with the measure that a person measures, he is measured with it? As it is stated: “In full measure [besase’a], when you send her away, you contend with her” (Isaiah 27:8). In other words, in the measure, bese’a, that one used in one’s sin, God will contend with, i.e., punish, him.”

This verse is used to demonstrate the concept of ‘measure for measure,’ the idea that people get punished, treated, the way they treat others. The Talmud in Shabbat 105b (The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).) states: “Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of Bar Kappara: Anyone who sheds tears over an upright person, the Holy One, Blessed be He, counts his tears and places them in His treasury, as it is stated: “You have counted my wanderings, put my tears into your bottle, are they not in your book?” (Psalms 56:9). Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Anyone who is lazy in eulogizing a Torah scholar, it is fitting to bury him alive, as it is stated: “And they buried him in the border of his inheritance in Timnat-seraḥ, which is in the hill-country of Ephraim, on the north of the mountain of Ga’ash” (Joshua 24:30). This teaches that the mountain raged against them to kill them because they did not eulogize him appropriately. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Whoever is lazy in eulogizing a Sage does not live a long life, and his punishment is measure for measure. Since he was unconcerned with the death of the Sage, in the heavens they will be unconcerned with his death. The Holy One, Blessed be He, conducts Himself in this manner, as it is stated: “In full measure [besase’a], when You send her away You contend with her” (Isaiah 27:8), and the Sages derived that God punishes from the words: “You contend with her,” and He does so measure for measure, se’a for se’a, from the word sase’a in the verse above.” Rashi explains that the ‘measure for measure’ being enacted here is that he did not care for eulogizing the sage, in that his days were cut short, so too from heaven, they will not care for his.

The Mishnah, in Sanhedrin 10:1 (trans, from the Talmud, Sanhedrin 90a, The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).) states: “All of the Jewish people, even sinners and those who are liable to be executed with a court-imposed death penalty, have a share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And your people also shall be all righteous, they shall inherit the land forever; the branch of My planting, the work of My hands, for My name to be glorified” (Isaiah 60:21).
And these are the exceptions, the people who have no share in the World-to-Come, even when they fulfilled many mitzvot: One who says: There is no resurrection of the dead.” The Talmud (90a) comments: “And why is one punished to that extent for saying that there is no resurrection of the dead derived from the Torah? The Sages taught in a baraita: He denied the resurrection of the dead; therefore he will not have a share in the resurrection of the dead, as all measures dispensed by the Holy One, Blessed be He, to His people are dispensed measure for measure, i.e., the response is commensurate with the action.“

The Talmud here brings different verses from which it derives this concept:

“This is based on that which Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: From where is it derived that all measures dispensed by the Holy One, Blessed be He, are dispensed measure for measure? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated concerning the siege of Jerusalem: “And Elisha said: Hear the word of the Lord; so said the Lord: Tomorrow at this time one se’a of fine flour will be sold for one shekel and two se’a of barley for one shekel in the gate of Samaria” (II Kings 7:1). And it is written: “And the officer on whose hand the king leaned answered the man of God and said: Will the Lord make windows in heaven? Might this thing be? And he said: You shall see it with your eyes, but you shall not eat from there” (II Kings 7:2). And it is written: “And it was for him so, and the people trampled him in the gate, and he died” (II Kings 7:20).”

We find many other times where nature would bring about such ‘measure for measure’ form of justice.

See for instance Tractate Kallah Rabbati 1, 13. The William Davidson Talmud (Araha, Cohen, Soncino Press, 1965):
“BARAITHA. R. Joḥanan b. Dahabai said: The Ministering Angels told me four things, viz.: Why [are children born] lame? Because [their parents] overturned their tables. Why [are children born] blind? Because [their parents] gazed at ‘that place’. Why [are children born] dumb? Because [their parents] kiss ‘that place’. Why [are children born] deaf? Because [their parents] converse during cohabitation.

GEMARA. Raba said: All the attributes of the Holy One, blessed be He, [are exercised towards man on the principle of] measure for measure. Man ‘overturned his table’, therefore the feet of his children are deformed; he gazed at the pudenda which should be hidden from all, therefore is he hidden from his children; he showed no regard for the mouth that speaks and by which the kiss [of love] is given and kissed what is closed, therefore the mouth of his children is closed; he conversed at a time when he should have been silent, therefore the ear [52a] of his children is silenced. Why is [a deaf person] termed ḥeresh? Because he keeps silent [ḥoresh], as it is written, And Jacob held his peace [weheḥerish] until they came. Raba said: All these [children are so affected only] if they are conceived from such cohabitation.”
43
The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).
44
See for instance; Beit Din Makin Veonshin, Aaron Kirschenbaum, p. 952.
45
Based on The Rashi Ketuvim by Rabbi Shraga Silverstein translation.
46
See for instance Rav Pninim (Alshich) on the verse. And see also Zohar, Miketz 9 (The Zohar; London, Soncino Press, 1933): “The Judean then followed with a discourse on the verse: A faithful man shall abound with blessings (Prov. 28, 20). ‘This speaks of the man’, he said, ‘who puts his trust in God, like R. Jesse the elder, who, although he had food for the day, would not prepare his meal before he had prayed for his daily bread to the Holy King; and he used to say, “We shall not eat before we obtain permission from the King.””
47
See for instance; Shemot Rabbah 51 (and Yalkut Shimoni on Torah 414), and Midrash Tanchuma Buber, Pekudei 1 (John T. Townsend, 1989): “A FAITHFUL PERSON WILL RECEIVE MANY BLESSINGS, [BUT ONE WHO HASTENS TO BECOME RICH WILL NOT GO UNPUNISHED]. In the case of whoever is faithful, you find that the Holy One brings blessings through him; but whoever is unfaithful AND HASTENS TO BECOME RICH WILL NOT GO UNPUNISHED.” Rasag, Ralbag, and Metzudat David on the verse, Sha’arei Kedusha, Part 2 5, and the sources in the next footnote and Chemdas Yamim, yom tov 4, 91.
48
Menorat HaMaor, xii; On Upright Conduct in Business, Acting in business honestly. And see also Reshit Chokhmah, Chapter of Honest Commerce 2. And see Toldot Yaakov Yosef, Miketz, in the name of the Alshich.
49
The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz). And see Meiri on Yoma 22b, and Meiri on Beitzah, end of 15b.
50
In his commentary on Proverbs, 28:20.
51
See for instance; Shenei Luchot HaBerit, Aseret HaDibrot, Chullin, Ner Mitzva, dfus rishon p. 114a, in the new print, “yad ramah”; נד, on p. 84.
52
The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).
53
We also often find the idea that God thinks of financial sin/mitzvah, as though it happened with him. For instance; it says in Jerusalem Talmud Sukkah 3:1 (Heinrich W. Guggenheimer, 1999-2015): “Rebbi Levi said, to what is one compared who takes a robbed lulav? To one who honored the ruler with a basket and it turned out that it belonged to the latter.” The commentators (see for instance Korban Haedah there) explain that when someone steals, its as though he stole from God, and see also Gilyonei Hashas, rabbi Yosef Engel, on Baba Batra 88b. Similarly, the Babylonian Talmud, in Bava Batra 10a (The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz)): “Rabbi Yoḥanan says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “He that graciously gives to the poor makes a loan to the Lord, and that which he has given, He will pay him back” (Proverbs 19:17)? How can it be that one is considered to have granted a loan to God? Were it not explicitly written in the verse, it would be impossible to say this, that somebody who is gracious to a poor person is seen as lending to God. It would be impertinent, since “the borrower is servant to the lender” (Proverbs 22:7), as it were.” And see also Shenei Luchot HaBerit, Vavei HaAmudim 14.
54
See for instance; Sefer Chasidim 1076.
55
The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).
56
Metsudah Publications, 2009.
57
The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).
58
In addition, see for instance the Mishnah in Pah 8:9 (Dr. Joshua Kulp), “One who has fifty zuz and he is using them for his business, he must not take. And anyone who does not need to take [charity] and yet takes, will not depart from this world before he actually needs [charity] from others… And anyone who is not lame or blind but pretends to be as one of these, he will not die of old age before he actually becomes one of these, as it is said, “He who searches for evil, it shall come upon him” (Proverbs 11:27) and it is also said: “Righteousness, righteousness shall you pursue” (Deuteronomy 16:20). And any judge who accepts a bribe or who perverts justice will not die in old age before his eyes have become dim…”
59
Translation from; Bava Metzia 33a, The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).
60
Sefaria Community Translation.
61
See for instance Megalleh Ẓefunot on Toldot, towards the end, p. 75b, in the name of his teacher.
62
See “The Old Man and his Grandson” on Wikipedia. See also Derech Emunah, by Rabbi Jacob ben Sha’ul ha-Kohen Dweck, a contemporary of the Ben Ish Chai, on p. 114, that he brings a similar story in the name of commentators, with the same message.
63
Nobody Knows My Name (1961) ‘Fifth Avenue, Uptown: a letter from Harlem’, p. 173.
64
Midrash Talpiot, very beginning of the book, av vaem.
65
Ibn Ezra Exodus 20:12. See also Pa’aneaḥ Raza and Shadal there.
66
See for instance Pa’aneaḥ Raza, on the verse in Exodus 20:12, and Hadar Zekenim on Torah, Exodus 20:12.
67
See; Hadar Zekenim on Torah, Exodus 20:12.
68
See; Malmad Hatalmidim, Yitro, dibur hachamishi, Abarbanel Exodus 20:12, and see Bechor Shor.
69
Steinsaltz on Deuteronomy 5:16, The Steinsaltz Tanakh – English.
70
Deuteronomy 15:10, The Koren Jerusalem Bible.
71
Proverbs 10:2 and 11:4, The Rashi Ketuvim by Rabbi Shraga Silverstein.
72
Shabbat 156b (The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz)): “Rabbi Akiva had a daughter, and Chaldean astrologers told him that on the same day that she enters the wedding canopy, a snake will bite her and she will die. She was very worried about this. On that day, her wedding day, she took the ornamental pin from her hair and stuck it into a hole in the wall for safekeeping, and it happened that it entered directly into the eye of the snake. In the morning, when she took the pin, the snake was pulled and came out with it. Her father Rabbi Akiva said to her: What did you do to merit being saved from the snake? She told him: In the evening a poor person came and knocked on the door, and everyone was preoccupied with the feast and nobody heard him. I stood and took the portion that you had given me and gave it to him. Rabbi Akiva said to her: You performed a mitzva, and you were saved in its merit. Rabbi Akiva went out and taught based on this incident that even though it is written: “And charity will save from death” (Proverbs 10:2), it does not mean that it will save a person only from an unusual death, but even from death itself.”
73
See; Beur HaGra on Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 247:7, and Remah there.
74
The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).
75
See above, footnote 53.
76
Dr. Joshua Kulp.
77
Sermons Unto My People, Chanuka, Purim, and Special Shabbatot 10, Midat Sodom.
78
The Descent of Man, p. 163.
79
See Beit Din Makin Veonshin, Aaron Kirschenbaum, p. 958, in context of ‘eye for an eye’, and see also later, in the selfish gene.
80
The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).

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Pay It Forward: A Jewish Movie Review

Pay It Forward: A Jewish Movie Review

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