בס”ד

Click (2006): A Halachic Movie Review

In the 2006 film Click, directed by Frank Coraci, Adam Sandler plays Michael Newman, an overworked architect who struggles to balance his demanding career with his family life. One day, he comes into possession of a mysterious universal remote control – but this device doesn’t just control electronics; it controls time itself. With the press of a button, Michael can skip to the “next chapter” of his life, bypassing anything he finds tedious, frustrating, or painful. He skips arguments with his wife, long waits in traffic, and other inconveniences. At first, this power seems like a dream come true – finally, a way to live without discomfort or delay.

But as the film progresses, the cost of skipping life becomes painfully apparent. Michael begins to miss important moments – both joyful and painful – that shape who he is. The more he avoids discomfort, the more disconnected he becomes from those around him, and from himself. The film ultimately delivers a sobering message: life’s uncomfortable chapters are not obstacles to happiness – they’re an essential part of it.

This idea raises a striking and provocative halachic question: if we had the option, would we choose to skip the spiritually uncomfortable parts of life? And more importantly – would halacha permit it? Could someone, in theory, “skip” Rosh Hashanah?

Broader Halachic Considerations

Addressing such a question requires us to think beyond the technical permissibility of skipping a single mitzvah or holiday. We must consider the broader halachic implications – and the spiritual dangers such a choice could bring..

In the Talmud, Rav Huna discusses a case in which someone becomes lost in the desert and forgets what day it is. He rules: “he counts six days from the day that he realized that he lost track of Shabbat and then observes one day as Shabbat.”¹ The rationale is to ensure that Shabbat is not forgotten.²

This halacha is codified in the Shulchan Aruch:

One who is wandering in the desert and does not [know] when is Shabbat, counts seven days from the day he realized he did not know, and sanctifies the seventh day with Kiddush and Havdalah.³

The Shulchan Aruch HaRav expands on this, ruling that the day the person designates as Shabbat attains a rabbinic-level sanctity. He may not perform even rabbinically prohibited melachot (acts that are forbidden on shabbat) on that day, likening it to the second day of Yom Tov observed in the Diaspora:⁴

A person who was traveling in the desert [and lost track of the days and] does not know which day is Shabbos should count seven days from the day when he became aware that he lost track [of the previous days]. [That person] should sanctify that seventh day by reciting Kiddush [at its onset] and Havdalah [at its departure, doing so] merely as a remembrance, so that he will have one day that is distinct from the other days and thus not forget the concept of Shabbos…
…According to Rabbinic Law, [the person] must regard his “seventh day” as Shabbos. He is [therefore] forbidden to perform any activity forbidden as a shvus, just as one is [forbidden to do so] on the second day of festivals [observed in the Diaspora.] They [were also instituted] because of doubt, and yet one is then forbidden to perform any activity forbidden as a shvus for the above reason.⁵

Ilan Ramon and Shabbat in Space

Ilan Ramon, the first Israeli astronaut, was a father of four and served as a payload specialist on NASA’s Space Shuttle mission STS-107. Scheduled to launch on June 27, 2002,⁶ the mission was delayed and ultimately launched on January 16, 2003. It spent 15 days, 22 hours, 20 minutes, and 32 seconds in orbit. Tragically, the mission ended on February 1, 2003, with the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster, which claimed the lives of all seven crew members and destroyed the shuttle.⁷

Before the mission’s originally scheduled launch, Ilan addressed the assembled Jewish community leaders. Rabbi Zvi Konikov, director of Chabad of the Space & Treasure Coasts in Florida, recalls:⁸

After his speech he approached me. He greeted me with a warm hug and presented me with his request: “Rabbi I need to talk with you. I want to keep Shabbat while in space but no one can tell me how to do it!”
And that was how our friendship began.
Ilan was a very special Jew. He often expressed the thought that he saw his trip to space as a mission. “I will represent the entire Jewish people,” he would say. As a representative of the Jewish people he wanted to do everything in the very best possible way Jewishly; including keeping Shabbat and eating only kosher food…
…Shabbat also presented quite a challenge. A day/night cycle in orbit is 90 minutes long, which means that a week lasts a mere ten and a half hours from start to finish! Would Ilan need to keep Shabbat every half day?!

Rabbi Konikov submitted the question to a rabbinic journal, and numerous halachic authorities responded.⁹ One notable opinion came from Rabbi Levi Yitzchak Halperin, who later published his analysis in a book titled Im Esak Shamayim,¹⁰ dedicated to Ilan Ramon and focused on the topic of Judaism in space.

Rabbi Halperin argued that time-bound mitzvot do not apply in space, as applying standard halachic timing in orbit would be absurd. For instance, Ramon would theoretically need to put on tefillin sixteen times a day, recite the Shema thirty-two times, and observe Shabbat nearly three times within a single 24-hour period. Holidays like Rosh Hashanah would recur every twenty days, and mitzvot such as reciting the Shema would have only fleeting moments in which to be fulfilled.

Nevertheless, Rabbi Halperin ruled that Ramon should count six days and observe Shabbat on the seventh, based on the Talmudic precedent of the desert wanderer. He maintained that the principle of “so as not to forget Shabbat” still applies in space, and added that the same reasoning would seemingly extend to all the festivals as well.

One could argue that this consideration applies in our case as well: one should not ‘skip’ Rosh Hashanah, lest he come to forget it.¹¹

In fact, the reasoning might be even more relevant here: whereas Ilan Ramon’s mission was a one-time, two-week experience, someone who regularly chooses to “skip” Rosh Hashanah could genuinely forget its laws over time.

Is the Act Itself Forbidden?

A Mystical Argument:

To explore whether skipping Rosh Hashanah is halachically forbidden, we must first examine the nature of mitzvot and the scope of their obligation. Rabbi Yosef Engel, in his work Asvan DeOraita,¹² raises a thought-provoking question:

The Talmud (Avodah Zarah 54a) states: “The Merciful One exempts a victim of circumstances beyond his control.”¹³ But what exactly is being lifted in such cases? Is it merely the liability for failing to perform the mitzvah, or is the mitzvah itself entirely nullified for that individual?

This distinction, though subtle, is deeply significant. Does exemption mean that God never commanded the mitzvah to this person in the first place? Or does it mean that the obligation remains in principle, but the person is not held accountable because the failure was beyond their control?

Bein Adam LaMakom vs. Bein Adam Lechaveiro

Rabbi Engel suggests that the answer may depend on the category of mitzvah. Mitzvot generally fall into two types: bein adam laMakom – commandments between a person and God (such as wearing tefillin or observing Shabbat), and bein adam lechaveiro – commandments between people (such as repaying a debt).

In the case of bein adam laMakom, the Talmud (Avodah Zarah 3a) teaches that “the Al-mighty does not confront His creatures with unfair demands”.¹⁴ If a person is unable to fulfill a religious duty – say, due to illness or physical limitation – he may be considered never to have been commanded at all. But bein adam lechaveiro obligations are different. If one owes money but cannot repay it, the obligation remains; the mitzvah is not lifted simply because of inability.¹⁵

The distinction becomes even clearer with mitzvot that are goal-oriented. Some commandments are not about performing a specific action, but about achieving a particular outcome. In such cases, even if one cannot personally fulfill the mitzvah, the obligation may still remain in force.¹⁶

Mitzvot With Desired Outcomes

An illustrative example appears in the Mishna (Gittin 41a), in a dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai regarding a “half-slave” – a man owned by two masters, only one of whom has set him free. He is now half-free and half-enslaved:

In the case of one who is a half-slave half-freeman because only one of his two owners emancipated him, he serves his master one day and serves himself one day; this is the statement of Beit Hillel. Beit Shammai say: Through such an arrangement you have remedied his master, as his master loses nothing through this. However, you have not remedied the slave himself, as the slave himself remains in an unsustainable situation. It is not possible for him to marry a maidservant because he is already a half-freeman, as it is prohibited for a freeman to marry a maidservant. It is also not possible for him to marry a free woman, as he is still a half-slave. If you say he should be idle and not marry, but isn’t it true that the world was created only for procreation, as it is stated: “He did not create it to be a waste; He formed it to be inhabited” (Isaiah 45:18)? Rather, for the betterment of the world his master is forced to make him a freeman, and the slave writes a promissory note accepting his responsibility to pay half his value to his master. And Beit Hillel ultimately retracted their opinion, to rule in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai, that a half-slave must be set free.¹⁷

While the arrangement of working one day for his master and one day for himself may seem sustainable, Beit Shammai argue that the condition of the slave remains fundamentally untenable: he is unable to fulfill his obligation to procreate.

Notably, Beit Shammai support their position not with the standard mitzvah of “Be fruitful and multiply,” (Genesis 1:28),¹⁸ but with a broader verse from Isaiah: “He formed it to be inhabited.” These verses reflect two distinct commandments. The verse from Genesis is a directive specifically obligating men to engage in reproduction. In contrast, the verse from Isaiah articulates a more universal imperative—one that encompasses not only men, but also women and slaves. It is not a command to perform a particular act, but rather an expression of divine will: that the world be populated and sustained.

Tosafot raises an important point: Beit Shammai’s argument rests on the assumption that the half-slave is unable to marry anyone – neither a maidservant, since he is half-free, nor a free woman, since he is still half-slave. This implies that if marriage to a maidservant were halachically permitted, there would be no need to free him. In that case, he would be able to fulfill the broader imperative of “He formed it to be inhabited” through procreation with a maidservant. He would, however, still remain unable to fulfill the more specific commandment of “Be fruitful and multiply.”

This leads to a deeper question: If the slave remains unable to fulfill the more specific commandment of “Be fruitful and multiply,” why is the master not obligated to free him for the sake of that mitzvah as well?

Tosafot therefore concludes that the master is not obligated to emancipate the slave in order to enable him to fulfill the commandment of “Be fruitful and multiply.” That obligation arises only if the slave is unable to fulfill the broader imperative of “He formed it to be inhabited.” Tosafot explains¹⁹ that the mitzvah of “Be fruitful and multiply” applies only when its fulfillment is realistically possible. Since the half-slave is currently unable to marry anyone, the commandment does not apply to him at all – and as a result, the master bears no obligation to facilitate its fulfillment.

However, this reasoning does not extend to the broader imperative of “He formed it to be inhabited.” Tosafot does not explain why, but the distinction seemingly lies in the nature of the two mitzvot. Whereas “Be fruitful and multiply” is a directive to perform a specific action – namely, procreation – “He formed it to be inhabited” conveys a divine desire for a particular outcome: a populated world. Because this mitzvah is focused on the result rather than the act itself, it remains binding even when actual fulfillment is impossible. The individual remains obligated despite his personal limitations, and the master is therefore required to free him.²⁰

Following this, Rabbi Yosef Engel draws a critical distinction regarding the nature of our obligation to fulfill mitzvot. When a person is unable to perform a mitzvah, he may be entirely exempt – not only from liability, but from the obligation itself. This applies to mitzvot such as “Be fruitful and multiply,” which are formulated as direct commands to perform a specific action. If a person is incapable of fulfilling such a command, it is not merely that they are excused; they were never obligated in the first place. It would be unreasonable, Rabbi Engel argues, for God to command an act that is impossible to carry out.

By contrast, mitzvot like “He formed it to be inhabited” are not specific directives to perform a particular act, but rather expressions of divine will for a certain state. Because the focus is on achieving an outcome rather than performing a defined action, the obligation applies even when the individual cannot personally accomplish it. In such cases, the mitzvah remains binding, and the individual must do whatever is within their power to help bring about that result. Accordingly, the master is required to free the slave – not because the slave can currently fulfill the mitzvah, but because he remains obligated to realize the divine goal when the opportunity arises.

In cases like this, where the mitzvah concerns bringing about a desired outcome, it logically follows that one must not ignore an opportunity to enable that result – even if direct fulfillment was previously impossible.

Mystical Considerations

As a mystic, I would argue that the mitzvot were given in order to bring about specific spiritual outcomes. Each commandment was issued not for the sake of the action itself, but because it serves as a vehicle to achieve a particular spiritual goal. From this perspective, the result is primary – the action is merely the means. The same applies to the mitzvah of shofar: its significance lies in the profound spiritual effect it produces, which is why God commanded its observance.

Some Hasidic sources take this idea even further.²¹ They suggest that the reason we do not blow the shofar when Rosh Hashanah falls on Shabbat is because Shabbat itself brings about the spiritual effect the shofar would have – rendering the act unnecessary on that day.

Since the mitzvah of hearing the shofar – from a mystical perspective – reflects a divine will for a particular spiritual outcome, it should not be neglected. By fulfilling the mitzvah, we do our part in realizing that divine intention. Skipping Rosh Hashanah would mean not only missing the commandment, but also forfeiting the opportunity to help bring about the spiritual goal that the mitzvah was designed to achieve.

A Halachic Argument

Granted, it may be inappropriate to skip Rosh Hashanah from a mystical perspective – but is it actually forbidden on a halachic level?

When Does the Obligation Begin?

A helpful way to approach this question is by asking: before Rosh Hashanah – at the moment one chooses to “skip” the holiday – is he already obligated to hear the shofar on the upcoming day? Or does the obligation only take effect once the holiday actually begins?

One could argue that time-bound mitzvot, such as hearing the shofar on Rosh Hashanah, only become binding once their designated time arrives. Until the onset of the holiday, the individual is not yet halachically obligated, and therefore may not be halachically required to ensure in advance that he will be able to fulfill the mitzvah when the time comes.

While this may sound abstract, it carries practical implications: if the obligation to hear the shofar has not yet taken effect, one could contend that there is no requirement to undertake drastic or burdensome measures²² beforehand in order to guarantee fulfillment of the mitzvah.

The Talmud in Rosh Hashanah 34b states:

And if one has to choose between hearing the shofar and reciting the blessings, the mitzva to be among those who sound the shofar is more important than the mitzva to be among those who recite the blessings. How so? If there are two towns, in one there are those who know how to sound the shofar, and in the other there are individuals who know how to recite the blessings, one should go to the place where they sound the shofar, and one does not go to the place where they know how to recite the blessings.²³

This case seems puzzling. Given that there is a mitzvah to hear the shofar, shouldn’t the residents of the town without a shofar be obligated to relocate before Rosh Hashanah so they can fulfill the mitzvah?

While one might assume the Talmud is referring to a situation where the residents are unable to relocate – or that halachically, such relocation is not required²⁴ – Rabbi Avraham Danzig offered a different explanation.²⁵

He argued that the obligation to hear the shofar only begins on Rosh Hashanah itself. Therefore, the residents are not required to relocate beforehand. Since the mitzvah has not yet taken effect prior to the holiday, no obligation exists at that point;²⁶ and once the holiday arrives, it is already too late – they find themselves in a situation where fulfillment is no longer possible.

Can one place himself in a situation where he is unable to fulfill a mitzvah?

This line of thinking invites a provocative question: could someone deliberately leave town before Rosh Hashanah, knowing he will be unable to hear the shofar?

At first glance, this might sound absurd. But let’s consider it from a theoretical standpoint. There are two key assumptions at play:

Before Rosh Hashanah: the person is not yet obligated in the mitzvot of rosh hashanah – to hear the shofar.
On Rosh Hashanah: if he is unable to fulfill the mitzvot of rosh hashanah, he is completely exempt and retroactively never commanded in the mitzvah.

Neither of these two premises are necessarily the accepted halachic positions.²⁷ However, if one were to accept them, it would seem that there is nothing inherently wrong with such a choice: the individual never failed to perform a mitzvah he was obligated in. Before Rosh Hashanah, the obligation to hear the shofar had not yet taken effect, and once the holiday arrived, he was unable to fulfill it – so, arguably, he was never commanded the mitzvah.²⁸

This question has clear parallels in everyday halachic life. Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach maintained that a person who is asleep is not currently obligated in mitzvot.²⁹ Accordingly, he ruled that there is no halachic obligation to wake someone in order for him to recite the Shema within its proper time frame. While it is certainly proper to wake him and help him fulfill the mitzvah, there is no legal requirement to do so – since, as long as he is asleep, he is not considered halachically obligated.

But could this logic be taken a step further? What if someone intentionally goes to sleep without setting an alarm, knowing that he will miss the time for Shema entirely? Could this be justified by arguing that he was not obligated at the time he fell asleep, and remained exempt while asleep – thereby never bearing the obligation at all?

“One who has no earth to cover with should not slaughter”

Despite this theoretical leniency, we find clear precedent that one may not place himself in a position where he will be unable to fulfill a mitzvah.³⁰

After slaughtering a wild animal or bird, the Torah (Leviticus 17:13) commands that the blood be covered with earth:

And if any Israelite or any stranger who resides among them hunts down an animal or a bird that may be eaten, that person shall pour out its blood and cover it with earth.³¹

The laws and details of this mitzvah are outlined in Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 28. In the first halachah, Rabbi Yosef Karo writes:³² “One who slaughters a wild animal or a bird needs to cover its blood…” The Rema (Rabbi Moses Isserles) adds: “And the covering is a commandment onto itself.”

In halachah 21, additional scenarios are addressed: “One who has no earth to cover [the blood] with, should not slaughter.” The Rema adds: “Rather, he should wait until he has earth.”

The intent is clear: one should not initiate the act of slaughtering if doing so would render him unable to fulfill the accompanying mitzvah of covering the blood. This reflects a broader principle: a person should not place himself in a situation where he will be unable to perform a mitzvah.

Avoiding a Mitzvah: Insulting to the Mitzvah

I would like to suggest the following interpretation of this halacha.

There is a well-known Mishnah (Makkot 3:16) often recited in synagogues before the Kaddish:

Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akashya says: The Holy One, Blessed be He, sought to confer merit upon the Jewish people; therefore, He increased for them Torah and mitzvot.³³

Our attitude toward mitzvot should reflect a sense of privilege. We show respect for mitzvot by viewing them as opportunities – not as burdens.

Avoiding: Tzitzit, Tithing, and Standing for the Elderly

An illustrative story appears in the Talmud (Menachot 41a) concerning the mitzvah of tzitzit. The mitzvah obligates a man wearing a four-cornered garment to attach fringes to it. If one does not wear such a garment, the obligation does not apply. In the story, Rav Ketina dressed intentionally in garments that exempted him from this mitzvah:

An angel found Rav Ketina when he was wearing a linen cloak, which is exempt from ritual fringes. The angel said to him: Ketina, Ketina, if you wear a linen cloak in the summer and a coat [sarbela], which has only two corners and is therefore also exempt from ritual fringes, in the winter, what will become of the ritual fringes of sky-blue wool? As a result, you will never fulfill the mitzva.
Rav Ketina said to him: Do you punish us even for failing to fulfill a positive mitzva? The angel said to him: At a time when there is divine anger and judgment, we punish even for the failure to fulfill a positive mitzva…
…this is what the angel is saying to Rav Ketina: Are you seeking ploys [tatzdeki] to exempt yourself from performing the mitzva of ritual fringes?³⁴

Tosafot (Arakhin 2b) offers important context:

In those times all [standard] cloaks had four corners that there was a punishment for the one that altered it to become exempt. But today – since most cloaks are exempt, there is no punishment for one who does not buy a cloak of four corners.³⁵

Clearly, the issue with Rav Ketina’s behavior was his active effort to avoid the mitzvah.³⁶

We find a similar principle regarding the mitzvah to stand in honor of the elderly and Torah scholars. The verse (Leviticus 19:32) says:

You shall rise before the aged and show deference to the old.³⁷

The Talmud (Kiddushin 32b) quotes a Baraita which expounds on this verse:

One might have thought that one may close his eyes like one who does not see the elder. Therefore, the verse states: “Before the hoary head you shall stand and you shall revere the face of an elder, and you shall fear your God” (Leviticus 19:32). With regard to any matter given over to the heart, it is stated: “And you shall fear your God.” This phrase is referring to a situation where it is impossible to prove whether one purposefully made it appear as if he were not aware that he was obligated to perform a mitzva, as only that individual and God know the truth.³⁸

The Talmud then asks:

The Gemara expresses surprise at this statement: Is that to say that we are dealing with wicked people who would intentionally act this way to avoid fulfilling a mitzva?

Since the Baraita cannot be referring to someone who is intentionally planning to sin, the Talmud offers a reinterpretation:

Rather, this means: One might have thought that one may close his eyes before the obligation to stand arrives, i.e., when the elder is still far off. This would mean that when the obligation does arrive he will not see him, such that he would be required to stand before him. In this manner he thinks that he can avoid the obligation altogether. Therefore the verse states: “You shall stand…and you shall fear,” i.e., one should fear He who knows the secrets of one’s heart.

Rashi explains: the verse “you shall fear Him” refers to the One who knows your inner thoughts – specifically, your intention to avoid being obligated in His commandments.³⁹ This passage teaches that one should not seek to evade obligation in a mitzvah. As Joshua Kulp put it:

The baraita is addressing one who might close his eyes before the sage is even close enough such that the obligation to rise kicks in. Technically this would be allowed. Therefore the Torah states “you shall fear.” A person should not intentionally put himself in a position to avoid fulfilling a commandment.⁴⁰

This principle is also reflected in the mitzvah of maaser (tithing). The Torah obligates a person to set aside a tenth of his produce as tithe. According to Rabbi Yannai, this obligation only takes effect once the produce enters the house through the main entrance.⁴¹ As he stated: “Untithed produce is not obligated in the mitzvah of tithing until it sees the front of the house.” Technically, then, if someone were to bring produce into the house through a window or side entrance, it would not become obligated in maaser, since it never “saw” the front of the house. This loophole was exploited by later generations:

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi El’ai: Come and see that the latter generations are not like the earlier generations. In the earlier generations, people would bring their fruits into their courtyards through the main gate in order to obligate them in tithes. However, the latter generations bring their fruits through roofs, through courtyards and through enclosed courtyards, avoiding the main gate in order to exempt them from the mitzva of tithing. As Rabbi Yannai said: Untithed produce is not obligated in the mitzva of tithing until it sees the front of the house through which people enter and exit, and it is brought into the house that way as it is stated in the formula of the confession of the tithes: “I have removed the consecrated from the house” (Deuteronomy 26:13), as the obligation to tithe produce whose purpose has not yet been designated takes effect only when it is brought into the house.⁴²

The Talmud is clearly critical of this behavior, and the Meiri explicitly writes that such actions are forbidden.⁴³

There are many additional examples of this sentiment.⁴⁴

The Permissibility of Avoiding Certain Mitzvot

One could argue that deliberately placing oneself in a situation where fulfilling a mitzvah becomes impossible reflects a certain disrespect for the mitzvah. This mindset is similar to that of someone actively seeking to avoid religious obligation. When a person intentionally creates circumstances in which he is exempt from a mitzvah – one he would ordinarily be obligated to perform – simply because he is unable to fulfill it, it suggests a lack of regard for the mitzvah. Therefore, knowingly putting oneself in a position where observance becomes unfeasible is seen as disrespectful and forbidden.

However, we do find situations where a person is permitted to avoid fulfilling a mitzvah:

As mentioned earlier, there is a mitzvah to place tzitzit on any four-cornered garment. However, a person is under no obligation to acquire or wear such a garment solely in order to fulfill this mitzvah. The commandment applies only if one happens to be wearing a four-cornered garment. In contemporary times, given the way people usually dress, such garments are uncommon. Therefore, someone who follows modern fashion and does not wear a four-cornered garment is not doing anything wrong – there is no obligation to create the opportunity to fulfill this mitzvah.

A similar principle applies to the mitzvah of Birkat Kohanim, the priestly blessing. While it is a mitzvah for a kohen to bless the Jewish people, he is only obligated to do so when he is called upon. There is no halachic requirement for a kohen to place himself in a situation where he will be summoned to perform the blessing.

The Shulchan Arukh (Orach Chayim 128:2-4) states:

Any Kohen who does not have one of the things that prevent [him from performing Birkat Kohanim] — if he does not ascend to the platform, even though he has [only] forfeited one positive commandment, it is as if he has violated three positive commandments if he was in the synagogue when they called “Kohanim” or if they told him to go up or to wash his hands…
…When the Kohanim do not want to ascend to the platform, they are not required to stay outside the synagogue except during the time when the chazzan calls “Kohanim.”⁴⁵

Similarly, Shulchan Arukh Harav (128:1-3) writes:

It is a positive commandment of Scriptural origin for the kohanim to bless the Jewish people every day…
…[The above applies] only if the kohen was in the synagogue when the sheliach tzibbur called out “Kohanim!” or if one of his fellow congregants told him to ascend [to deliver the blessing] or to wash his hands [in preparation for its recitation]. [This is implied by] the verse, “Say to them,” which is rendered in the [Aramaic] Targum as, “When you say to them.” [The inference is that] if he is not [called], he is not at all obligated to deliver the blessing, unless he does so on his own initiative…
…Accordingly, in the case of a kohen who is weak and does not wish to recite the Priestly Blessing… [he should depart] so that he will not be in the synagogue when the sheliach tzibbur calls out “Kohanim!”⁴⁶

This raises a compelling question: How can it be permissible to avoid these mitzvot? Doesn’t deliberately avoiding the opportunity to fulfill a commandment suggest a lack of respect for the mitzvah itself? Are we not, in effect, showing disregard by choosing not to place ourselves in a position of obligation? This question becomes especially striking in the case of the kohen who intentionally leaves the room in order to avoid being called upon to perform Birkat Kohanim. Isn’t such a deliberate act of avoidance a sign of disrespect toward the mitzvah?

Conditional and Unconditional Mitzvot

I would like to preface with a distinction between two categories of mitzvot:

Maimonides writes in Mishneh Torah, Berakhot 11:2:

There are positive commandments that a person is obligated to make an effort to pursue [their fulfillment] until he performs them – for example, tefillin, sukkah, lulav, and shofar. These are referred to as obligations, since a person is obligated to fulfill them.
There are other mitzvot that are not obligations, but resemble voluntary activities – for example, [the mitzvot of] mezuzah and constructing a guardrail. A person is not obligated to dwell in a house that requires a mezuzah [just in order] to fulfill this mitzvah. Instead, if he desires, he can dwell in a tent or a ship for his entire life. Similarly, he does not have to build a house [just] in order to build a guardrail.⁴⁷

This distinction is fundamental. Some mitzvot are unconditional obligations – a person must actively seek to fulfill them regardless of circumstance. Examples include tefillin and shofar. A Jewish man is required to acquire and wear tefillin daily, and to hear the shofar on Rosh Hashanah. These commandments apply universally, without any prerequisite action.

Other mitzvot, by contrast, are conditional – they depend on the presence of a particular situation or context. For example, the mitzvah to repay a debt applies only if one has borrowed money. If a person never borrows, he is never obligated in that mitzvah.

The mitzvah of tzitzit falls into this latter category. There is no obligation to wear a four-cornered garment; the commandment applies only if and when a person chooses to wear such a garment. In that case, he must attach tzitzit to it. But if he never wears such a garment, he is never obligated to fulfill the mitzvah. Thus, avoiding the situation altogether does not imply disrespect – it simply means the mitzvah never became relevant. One is not halachically required to create a scenario in which the mitzvah applies.

The same logic applies to the mitzvah of Birkat Kohanim, the priestly blessing. A kohen is only obligated to perform this mitzvah when he is called upon during the service. If he is not present, or he steps out before being called, the obligation never takes effect. Therefore, his avoidance of the mitzvah is not considered disrespectful; it is simply a matter of the condition for obligation never being met.

However, this distinction is critical: it is one thing to avoid the situation that would obligate a mitzvah, and another to create a situation in which one would ordinarily be obligated, but is unable to fulfill the mitzvah. The latter is halachically problematic.⁴⁸ For example, if a person chooses to wear a four-cornered garment knowing that he cannot attach tzitzit to it, he has intentionally placed himself in a scenario where, under normal circumstances, he would be obligated to perform the mitzvah – but is now unable to do so. This constitutes a form of disrespect toward the commandment, as it reflects a conscious decision to undermine its fulfillment.

Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Orach Chayim 13:6) addresses this directly.⁴⁹ He writes that wearing a four-cornered garment without tzitzit is ordinarily a violation of the positive commandment. However, on Shabbat, when attaching tzitzit would involve a forbidden labor, it is technically permissible to wear the garment without tzitzit, since the commandment is suspended due to practical impossibility. Nevertheless, the Sages forbade doing so:

On Shabbos, however, when the laws of Shabbos do not allow him to attach tzitzis to it, there is no Scriptural prohibition against wearing a tallis without tzitzis. For the Torah did not state, “Do not wear a garment without tzitzis.” Rather, after one has put on [a four-cornered] garment, there is a positive commandment to attach tzitzis to it. [Thus, in the situation described above,] since one may not attach [tzitzis on Shabbos], he is not transgressing.
The Sages, however, forbade wearing [such a garment], for ultimately this would negate a Scriptural commandment.⁵⁰

Covering Blood: A Conditional Obligation

The same principle applies to the mitzvah of covering the blood after slaughtering an animal: its obligation arises only in specific circumstances. The mitzvah is conditional upon the act of kosher ritual slaughter. If a person never performs ritual slaughter, they are never required to cover the blood. There is nothing halachically problematic about choosing not to engage in the act of slaughtering.

In fact, shechita (ritual slaughter) itself is a non-obligatory mitzvah. It does not command one to seek out animals to slaughter; rather, it prescribes how meat must be prepared if one chooses to eat it. Like the mitzvah of tzitzit, which only applies if one wears a four-cornered garment, the mitzvah of shechita is conditional – triggered solely by personal choice.

This idea is found in several mitzvot where the obligation arises only from an individual’s decision. For example, the mitzvah of get (halachic divorce) applies only if a man chooses to divorce his wife. There is no commandment to initiate divorce; the mitzvah regulates how it must be carried out if the decision is made. Likewise, there is no obligation to create opportunities for ritual slaughter or to fulfill the associated mitzvah of covering the blood.

Covering the Blood – Only When the Meat Is Kosher

The mitzvah of covering the blood applies only to kosher shechita. If the slaughter was not halachically valid, the obligation does not apply. As Maimonides writes in Mishneh Torah, Shechita 14:10: “The only blood that must be covered is the blood of slaughter [that produces meat] that is fit to be eaten, as [the prooftext cited] states: ‘that may be eaten.’”⁵¹

It follows, then, that if someone kills an animal in a manner that does not meet the halachic criteria for valid slaughter, they have done nothing wrong. This choice does not diminish or disrespect the mitzvah of covering the blood, because the obligation was never triggered. There is no requirement to create a situation in which the mitzvah would apply. Choosing a method of killing that avoids halachic slaughter is not an act of avoidance – it simply means the person has not entered into the circumstances that would obligate them.

Suppose someone needs the blood of an animal rather than its meat. Since a halachically valid slaughter would obligate them to cover the blood, they may choose to kill the animal in a manner that does not render it kosher. The Talmud (Chullin 85b) addresses this directly:

One who slaughters a bird or an undomesticated animal, and does so only because he needs the blood, is nevertheless obligated to cover the blood and may not use it for any other purpose? Rather, how should one who needs the blood act? He either stabs it or tears loose its windpipe and its gullet, so that it is not killed with an act of slaughter…
…When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: Go out and render the bird a tereifa, and then slaughter it, as the mishna teaches that one who slaughters a tereifa is not required to cover its blood. When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: Go out and tear loose the bird’s windpipe and gullet.⁵²

This practical advice was later codified in Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 28:18:

One who slaughters, even if he only wants the blood, he’s obligated to cover. How should he perform [the slaughtering instead?] He should stab or tear out [the organs] in order to be exempt from covering.⁵³

Since the necessary conditions for the mitzvah were not met, the person was never obligated to fulfill it, and therefore his actions are not considered disrespectful.⁵⁴ He simply chose not to place himself in a situation where the mitzvah would apply – something he is under no obligation to do. However, if he kills the animal through a halachically valid slaughter, thereby creating a situation in which the mitzvah would normally apply, but lacks the means (e.g., dirt) to cover the blood, the dynamic changes. Although he may be completely exempt from the mitzvah due to practical inability, he nonetheless demonstrates a disregard for it by placing himself in this situation. This is no longer a case of not creating the obligation, since under normal circumstances he would be obligated in the mitzvah. Therefore, by placing himself in this situation, he shows a lack of care toward fulfilling the mitzvah, and for that reason, it would be forbidden.

Summary:

In summary, one is permitted to wear garments that do not have four corners and would therefore not be obligated in the mitzvah of tzitzit. A kohen is allowed to leave the room before being called to bless the Jewish people, thereby avoiding the obligation of the priestly blessing. Similarly, someone who needs only the blood of an animal may kill it in a way that does not require covering the blood.

In all of these cases, there is nothing wrong with avoiding a mitzvah, because the mitzvah is conditional on a particular situation. When that situation does not occur, the obligation does not exist. As such, the person is not insulting the mitzvah by not fulfilling it.

However, if someone puts on a garment with four corners in a situation where he will be unable to fulfill the mitzvah of tzitzit, or if someone slaughters an animal in a situation where he will be unable to cover its blood, then the dynamic is different. In these cases, the person has placed himself in a situation where the conditions for the mitzvah are met, and under normal circumstances, he would be obligated to fulfill it. By doing so without the means or intent to carry out the mitzvah, he demonstrates a lack of care and respect for the commandment. This constitutes an affront to the mitzvah.

Based on this, I would argue that even according to the views of Rabbi Yosef Engel and Rabbi Avraham Danzig – who maintain that one is not obligated in a mitzvah that he is unable to fulfill, and that the obligation does not exist before the designated time of the mitzvah – it is forbidden to deliberately place oneself in a situation where the obligation would normally apply, knowing that one will not be able to fulfill it.

The guiding principle is: it is wrong to circumvent a mitzvah that would normally be obligatory, but it is acceptable not to create a situation in which one would become obligated, when the mitzvah is conditional.

Therefore, I would argue that one is not permitted to go to sleep without setting an alarm, since doing so intentionally places oneself in a situation where the mitzvah of reciting the Shema will not be fulfilled. This mitzvah is not conditional; it is a direct obligation that one is required to actively pursue. By going to sleep without taking the necessary steps to ensure the mitzvah will be fulfilled, one effectively prevents the fulfillment of an obligation that would otherwise apply, and in doing so, demonstrates disregard for the mitzvah.

Seemingly, skipping Rosh Hashanah should be no different: while the person never technically violated any of the laws of Rosh Hashanah – since he was never present during Rosh Hashanah – the choice to skip it was, in essence, a choice to avoid a mitzvah that he would otherwise have been obligated in under normal circumstances. It is not merely a case of “not obligating oneself in a mitzvah,” but rather an active avoidance of the mitzvah. Such avoidance demonstrates disregard for the mitzvah and is, therefore, potentially forbidden.⁵⁵

A Sentimental Argument

Up to this point, the discussion has centered on the halachic permissibility of skipping Rosh Hashanah. But beyond the legal analysis lies a deeper issue: the attitude underlying such a choice. While it’s true that not every mitzvah is naturally enjoyable, choosing to avoid Rosh Hashanah might be the wrong approach – even if it were technically permissible.

Of course, it would be unreasonable to expect someone to enjoy something they do not. As the Sifra (Kedoshim 9:12) teaches:

A man should not say: I do not desire to wear sha’atnez; I do not desire to eat the flesh of a pig; I do not desire to cohabit with ervah (illicit relations). I do desire it, but what can I do? My Father in heaven has decreed against it!⁵⁶

The Torah does not demand that a person enjoy something they naturally dislike. However, choosing to opt out of a mitzvah may cross a different kind of line. This raises a deeper question: Is there an ideal attitude one ought to have toward the mitzvot of the Torah?

As mentioned earlier, mitzvot have spiritual objectives. They are in a person’s best interest. As Nachmanides put it: “There is a reason, benefit, and improvement for man in each of them [in each mitzvah].”⁵⁷

I would argue that even in cases where halacha does not obligate someone to perform a mitzvah, the ideal is to strive to fulfill it nonetheless.

As discussed, some mitzvot are conditional and apply only in specific circumstances. One is not required to create such a situation in order to obligate himself. For example, if someone needs animal blood, he could kill the animal in a way that does not render it kosher and thereby avoid the obligation of covering the blood. However, if he only needs a small amount of blood and could obtain it by slaughtering the animal in a kosher manner, there may be a preference to do so – so that he can fulfill the mitzvah.⁵⁸

We find a powerful precedent for this idea in the desire Moses had to enter Israel. The Talmud (Sotah 14a) teaches:

Rabbi Samlai taught: For what reason did Moses our teacher greatly desire to enter Eretz Yisrael? Did he need to eat of its produce, or did he need to satisfy himself from its goodness? Rather, this is what Moses said: Many mitzvot were commanded to the Jewish people, and some of them can be fulfilled only in Eretz Yisrael, so I will enter the land in order that they can all be fulfilled by me.⁵⁹

This passage is often taken to mean that one should seek out opportunities to fulfill mitzvot – even those that are not currently obligatory.⁶⁰

The Talmud in Pesachim 113b states:

Seven are ostracized by Heaven, despite the fact that they have not been ostracized in any court: A Jew who does not have… and ritual fringes on his garment, and a mezuza in his doorway;⁶¹

Tosafot offer two explanations: either the person owns a four-cornered garment and simply chooses not to wear it, or – more strikingly – even if he doesn’t own such a garment, he is still ostracized because he should go out of his way to acquire one. Tosafot supports this reading by referencing Moses, who longed to enter the Land of Israel in order to fulfill the mitzvot associated with it.

Rabbi Jonah ben Abraham Gerondi writes that a person may be punished for not desiring in his heart the beauty of the mitzvah and its reward – feelings that should have motivated him to place himself in a situation where he would become obligated to fulfill it.⁶²

There is significant precedent for striving to create opportunities for mitzvah performance, even when not technically required. Of course, this is not a universal rule. There are exceptions. Darkei Teshuvah,⁶³ for instance, notes that while one should generally try to obligate oneself in mitzvot (such as wearing tzitzit or paying workers on time), this may not apply to the mitzvah of ritual slaughter. He cites the Rema in Yoreh De’ah 28:2: “One who slaughters for the first time, makes a blessing of “that he gave us life” [shehechyanu] on the covering but not on the slaughtering since it damages a creature.”⁶⁴ He also references a talmudic story in context of the Rema’s verdict: “The Gemara stated that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s suffering came upon him due to an incident. What was that incident that led to his suffering? The Gemara answers that there was a certain calf that was being led to slaughter. The calf went and hung its head on the corner of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s garment and was weeping. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to it: Go, as you were created for this purpose. It was said in Heaven: Since he was not compassionate toward the calf, let afflictions come upon him.”⁶⁵

Some mitzvot are not ideal in nature – meaning that although the Torah provides a mitzvah for a given situation, the situation itself is undesirable.⁶⁶ In such cases, one should not seek to place himself in a situation that would obligate him in the mitzvah. Other mitzvot, however, are inherently positive and desirable. With regard to those, one should indeed strive to place himself in circumstances where he becomes obligated, in order to have the opportunity to fulfill them.⁶⁷

In that spirit, even if skipping Rosh Hashanah were not halachically forbidden, it would still reflect the wrong attitude. One should aspire to participate in the mitzvot, to see them as opportunities for spiritual growth, not as burdens to be avoided.

While it may be difficult to establish a clear-cut halachic prohibition, a sentimental – or what we might refer to in yeshiva as a hashkafic (philosophical and value-based) – argument often carries genuine weight in addressing questions like these.

I would like to conclude with a teaching from Rabbi Avraham Mordechai Alter, the Imrei Emes, the fourth Rebbe of Ger:

He wrote⁶⁸ that when a person passes away, they can no longer fulfill mitzvot. This, he explained, is why their relatives also refrain from performing certain mitzvot—as a sign of respect. The value of a mitzvah is so profound that it causes the deceased pain to be unable to participate. Therefore, the relative refrains from the mitzvah, as if to say: If you cannot take part, I won’t either.
To me, this attitude beautifully expresses the immense value of every mitzvah, and the ideal we should strive for: to fulfill as many mitzvot as possible.

Talmudinfo

1
Shabbat 69b, trans. Koren – Steinsaltz.
2
Rashi and other commentaries on the Talmud, Shabbat 69b.
This idea is found in many other issues, for instance regarding the four species on sukkot, Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 651 (Sefaria Community Translation) states: “These four species are all mutually necessary. If one lacks one of them, they should not bless on the rest and should just take them for memory’s sake [l’zecher] whether on the first or subsequent days.” This is based on the Rosh in Sukkah chapter 3 siman 14, who writes it is not to forget the mitzvah/its laws. The Shofar, in the Ran on Rosh Hashanah 8a (Rif’s pages), dibur hamatchil “hitkin”, and Ritva on Rosh Hashanah 29b, “mishecharav”. On shabbat regarding carrying and eiruv/hotzaa we find many sources, Eruvin 71b, Mishnah Berurah 392:5. And see; Ritva on Sukkah 14b, regarding sukkah (and see Hon Ashir on Mishnah Sukkah 2:3).
See also Bekhorot 27a (The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz)): “so that the halakhic category of ḥalla should not be forgotten.” And see: Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 322:3 (Sefaria Community Translation): “We separate challah in the Diaspora according to the words of the Sages in order that the teaching of challah will not be forgotten from Israel.” And see Tosafot Rash Mishantz, Pesachim 56b, regarding rabbinic maaser.
See also; Rashi on Chullin 133a regarding a person who is a kohen, so people should not forget that he is a kohen, and see Sefer Haora Part 1, 126, and Prisha, Orach Chayim 428 regarding “lo adu rosh”, so that we wont forget arava, if hoshana raba is on shabbat.
See also Shibbolei HaLeket 44, regarding reciting uva letziyon on shabbat and holidays during the mincha prayer. And see Rashi on Rosh Hashanah 7a “ein”, and see Rema Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 305:15, and in Darkei Moshe there from the Maharil. And see; Shita Mekubetzet, Beitzah 17b.
The idea of Haftora is also similar, see Shulchan Aruch Harav 284:1.
See also Pesachim 51a, where a similar principle is applied to all mitzvot.
3
Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim, 344:1, Sefaria Community Translation.
4
This is based on the Magen Avraham 344:3. In addition, see Rabbi Yosef Engel; Gilyonei Hashas Shabbat 69b, sometimes we can have separate counting for an individual. This might even be biblical, see also Teshuvot HaRadbaz Volume 1 76, and Likutei Sichot Vol. 8, Naso 3.
5
Pub. Kehot Publication Society, Trans. by Rabbi Eliyahu Touger and Uri Kaploun.
6
See Or Yisrael, Monsey, issue 29, p. 28.
7
See; “Ilan Ramon”, and “STS-107” on Wikipedia.
8
Konikov, Zvi, “Shabbat in Space, The Legacy of Ilan Ramon.” Chabad.org, Jan. 31, 2008.
9
See Or Yisrael (Monsey), issue 29, from p. 28; for Rabbi Konikovs question, and for the responses from the rabbis as to what should be done with regards to shabbat.
10
From p. 43, and see p. 50 regarding this applying to other holidays.
11
In addition see Likeutei Sichot, Vol. 37, p. 183.
12
Klal 13.
13
The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).
14
I saw this translation of the phrase in the book: ‘Hayom Yom: Tackling Life’s Tasks’ which can also be found at: https://www.chabad.org/therebbe/article_cdo/aid/3315303/jewish/12-Teves.htm#footnote2a3315303
15
In addition to Rabbi Engel, see; Nefesh Chaya (Margaliot), Orach Chayim 1, seif 5, and see Birkat Aharon (Levin), p. 20 (Berakhot 6a, maamar 27), (and Pardes Yosef, Tzav). In addition see Avnei Nezer, Orach Chayim, 501:3.
16
In addition to Rabbi Engel, see the Birkat Ahron mentioned in the previous footnote.
17
The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).
18
First to the fish, in Genesis 1:22, and then to Adam and Eve in verse 28, later to Noah in Chpt. 9, verse 1, 7. Later, the verse “Go, say to them, ‘Return to your tents’,” is understood as a repetition of this commandment to the jews (Sanhedrin 59b).
19
The tosafot brings a second answer too, Rabbi Engel understands it also in a manner which fits in with this line of reasoning.
20
The Chatam Sofer (Gittin there, dibur hamatchil “uma shekatvu tosafot”) and Ketav Sofer (Gittin there, dibur hamatchil “ela”) also have a similar understanding of this Tosafot.
21
See for instance Likutei Torah of the Baal HaTanya, In Derushim Lerosh Hashanah, p. 57a, and in his Siddur p. 243, and his grandson, the Tzemach Tzedek in Or Hatorah, Devarim 5, Rosh Hashana, p. 2108.
22
Such as traveling/relocating to another city, see Chayei Adam quoted in the article shortly.
23
The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).
24
See the Chayei Adam there, he suggests this too.
25
Chayei Adam, Nishmat Adam, 68:3, dibur hamatchil; ‘veod mita’am acher’.
26
Regarding this see also Rabbi Yosef Engel, Lekach Tov, klal 6, p. 31 (Warsaw edition), he beings proofs for this position, and see specifically “hamakom havav” where he brings an analogous idea like we will mention later, and writes it is rabbinically forbidden, however his reason is different to ours. And see Tzafnat Paaneach on the Rambam, shvuot 5:15.
27
Regarding that which the Chayei Adam said, there are those that seemingly would agree with it, see for instance Shut Yad Eliyahu, Siman 6, regarding going out of town and not praying with a minyan. There are however those that disagree with it, see for instance Imrei bina (Aurbach), Even Haezer 32, and Moadim Uzmanim (Sternbuch), Vol. 1, Siman 3.
And regarding that which Rabbi Yosef Engel claimed – that if someone is unable to fulfill a mitzvah he was never commanded to fulfill it – ; see Nekudot HaKesef, Yoreh De’ah 341:2, and Magen Avraham, Shulchan Arukh Harav, Mishnah Berurah, Orach Chayim 93. However the argument could be made that these sources would not prove the matter, since they are discussing ‘tashlumim’ (compensation) for prayer, which is different and incomparable since it is for ‘rachami’ (mercy); However Rabbi Yosef Engel equates them, and similarly see Likutei Sichot, Vol. 5, p. 81. There are however rishonim who write that there is no tashlumin for one who was incapable of praying, for instance Rav Neturai Gaon was seemingly of this opinion, it is brought down as psak in Tanya Rabbati end of hilchot tfila (tfilat arvit), similarly; Shibalei Haleket, tefila 54. As well as Nachshon Gaon, Teshuvot Hageonim, Chemda Genuza 48. There are some rishonim who bring this position along with a differing one; Rashbatz on Berakhot 26a; Sefer Hamichtam, Berakhot 26a; Sefer Habatim, Shaarei Tefila, Shaar Revii. There are also achronim who understand the Shulkhan Arukh this way, see for instance; Lerosh Yosef, Ben Porat Yosef, maarechet tzadi, tzarchei tzibur. However it would not seem like this, for example, in shulchan aruch harav 108:9 it says that if one was in jail and couldn’t pray because it was not suitable for praying, “when he is released he should recite all the Shemoneh Esreh prayers that he missed.” It is hard to justify this by blaming him for getting arrested.
28
The argument could be made that since he caused the situation he can not claim impunity due to inability.
See; Teshuvot haRashba Meyuchas LehaRamban 272, and see; Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 5:4, and see Igeret Hashmad, mahadurat Yitzchak A. Satz p. 259, and footnote 90 there, and see Sefer HaTashbetz, Part I 63, and Teshuvot HaRivash 11 and Teshuvot Maharit, I 21 quoting the Rivash with a proof from Esther.
29
See Halichot Shlomo, tfila, miluim 12.
30
While there are those who have raised a possibility for this, see for instance; Gam Ani Odcha, Teshuvot Harav Rephael Svid p. 60.
31
The Contemporary Torah, JPS, 2006.
32
Sefaria Community Translation.
33
Trans. Makkot 23b The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).
34
The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).
35
Sefaria Community Translation.
36
See Mishpetei Uziel, Volume IX, Yoreh De’ah 33, regarding giving a brit milah before the time creating a situation where when the time comes for the brit, he will be unable to fulfill it. He makes an argument quoting this talmudic passage, and see Likeutei Sichot, Vol. 37, p. 193 (and see also Igrot Kodesh, Vol. 13, letter 4624), and see Orach Yisrael 20:26, however that which he quoted from Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, is not really to the point. Many also use this talmudic passage to show that even mitzvot which are conditioned on something should be kept because the angel could get upset, see regarding this later “A Sentimental Argument.”
37
The Contemporary Torah, JPS, 2006.
38
The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).
39
See; Commentary on Sefer Hamitzvot of Rasag, Appendix 2:9, that from Rashi it would seem that this applies to all mitzvot not just this one where the verse applies. See however Shoel uMeshiv Mahadura III 1:120.
40
Daf Shevui to Kiddushin 33a.
41
See Bava Metzia 88a (The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz)):
“Rabbi Yannai says: The owner of untithed produce is not obligated in the mitzva of tithing until it sees the front of the house through which people enter and exit, and it is brought into the house through that entrance, as it is stated in the formula of the declaration of the tithes: “I have removed the consecrated from the house” (Deuteronomy 26:13), which indicates that the obligation to tithe produce whose purpose has not yet been designated applies only when it is brought into the house. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even bringing produce into the courtyard determines that the production process of the produce has been completed and that the produce is therefore subject to tithes, as it is stated in the confession of the tithes: “And I have given to the Levite, the stranger, the orphan, and the widow, and they shall eat in your gates and be satisfied” (Deuteronomy 26:12).”
42
Berakhot 35b. The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).
43
Meiri, Berakhot 35b “kvar amarnu.” In addition see; Commentary on Sefer Hamitzvot of Rasag, Appendix 2:9. See however Chochmat Shlomo quoted in Shulkhan Arukh Friedman in the back, on Yoreh Deah 28:18 who points out that this might differ since it is between man and fellow man, since maaser and similarly challah (in the following footnote), are given to others (like the poor, leviim, kohanim), it therefore would be wrong to avoid fulfilling the mitzvah.
44
See for instance; Mishneh Torah, bikurim 6:16: “It is forbidden for a person to make his dough less than the minimum measure in order to free it from the obligation of challah.” And see yevamot 18a regarding whether it is prohibited or permitted to nullify the mitzva of levirate marriage.
Some derive from the talmudic story with the angel regarding tzitzit, that even for mitzvot which are voluntary one has to make an effort to keep them, see for instance Tvuot Shor 1:59, and see later i will discuss this idea more in the forth problem, the sentimental one.
45
Sefaria Community Translation.
46
Pub. Kehot Publication Society, Trans. by Rabbi Eliyahu Touger and Uri Kaploun.
47
Trans. by Eliyahu Touger, Moznaim Publishing.
48
See Shulchan Aruch Harav 128:3, and 33, however he mentions a different reason it would be problematic in that case, he writes we should not use when chachamim were “oker”. However our reasoning is also true, and therefore it would be forbidden on this ground also, however since the chachamim were “oker” the mitzvah, it could be argued, our reasoning would not apply if using the “oker” is permissible. And see also Shulchan Aruch Harav 640, 8, about creating an exemption from sukkah, by making it uncomfortable.
49
While the Shulchan Aruch Harav seemingly holds that someone unable to fulfill a mitzvah is obligated in the mitzvah – unlike Rabbi Yosef Engel – nonetheless, this does not mean he would disagree with what is being said. And see Shulchan Aruch Harav, Orach Chayim 248, Kuntres Achron 1.
50
Pub. Kehot Publication Society, Trans. by Rabbi Eliyahu Touger and Uri Kaploun.
51
Trans. by Eliyahu Touger, Moznaim Publishing.
52
The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).
53
Sefaria Community Translation.
54
See Kerem Shlomo (Kotler) 58, see also Shaarei Tzion, Vol. 2, challah, 18:12. (Chanoch Kohen, Beit hilel issue 11) I would like to however point out, that while i do think this would be the correct verdict, I do believe that this is why someone is not in violation of this issue, I would however like to add, that this would not prove the idea, since if someone needs the blood he has to avoid the mitzvah, since he would need to cover otherwise, and there might be other reasons why this is not advised, other than that it is trying to circumvent a mitzvah, and see the commentaries there including the Pitchei Teshuva. Regarding the reason this is permissible others bring other explanations, see for instance Chochmat Shlomo, mentioned in an earlier footnote, it is quoted in the back, in the Yalkut Mefarshim.
55
There are other arguments that can be made along these lines, for instance see Minchat Asher, devarim 51.
56
Trans. Rabbi Shraga Silverstein.
57
Ramban on Deuteronomy 22:6, Charles B. Chavel. Shilo Pub. House, 1971-1976.
58
Look at the commentaries on Yoreh Deah 28:18, Pitchei Teshuva and Darkei Teshuva. It should be noted that the discussion surrounding this issue is predominantly for different reasons, however I do think that this consideration is true.
Regarding this idea (to do mitzvot even if it were completely optional), see Shaar Hamitzvot, hakdama.
59
The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).
60
See for instance Rosh on Moed Katan 3:80, and Charedim, hakdama (2), and the Tosafot and others mentioned above. Many of the above mentioned sources also reference the talmudic story regarding the angel who got upset with Rav Ketina for avoiding the mitzvah, regarding this idea. See also Rashba on Menachot 41a.
61
The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).
62
Saarei Teshuva, Shaar 3, 22, regarding tzitzit.
63
Yoreh De’ah 1:1.
64
Sefaria Community Translation.
65
Bava Metzia 85a, The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz).
66
See for instance Shaar Hamitzvot, hakdama, regarding the mitzvah of divorce.
67
While this principle is generally not treated as a formal halachic obligation, there are some rabbis who seem to treat it that way, see for instance See for instance Mekor Chayim, by Rabbi Jacob of Lisa, Brim, introduction to siman 331, 2. And see also Ein Hatchelet (Sifrei HaTchelet) of the “Baal Hatchelet”, 36, and later seemingly also applies a similar standard regarding a ‘safek’.
68
Divrei Menachem 1, p. 135.

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